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MAINSTREAMING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW: THE
COMMON LAW CASE FOR REASONABLE NOTICE OF
TERMINATION
Rachel Arnow-Richman*
This Article simultaneously exposes a fundamental error in
employment termination doctrine and a paradox in contract law
jurisprudence. Contemporary employment law has developed under the
assumption that at-will parties may terminate their relationship both
without reason and without notice. This Article argues that the second
half of this formulation—the idea that parties reserve the procedural
right to terminate without notice—is neither historically supported nor
legally correct. Employment at will, as originally expressed, was a mere
duration presumption reflecting America’s rejection of the predominant
British rule favoring one-year employment terms. While subsequent
case law expanded the presumption in various ways, a reinterpretation
that requires advance notice of termination remains compatible with the
way in which most contemporary courts articulate the rule.
In fact, an examination of general contract law reveals that in a
variety of nonemployment contexts, courts impose on parties to an
indefinite relationship the duty to provide reasonable notice while still
safeguarding their right to terminate at will. Such an obligation serves
not only as a gap filler in the face of contractual silence, but also as a
good faith limitation on parties’ exercise of substantive discretion.
Absent such a notice requirement, employment is an illusory
relationship, one that lacks the modicum of consideration necessary to
create a binding contract. While courts have sought to circumvent this
problem by theorizing employment as a unilateral contract, that
formulation is ill-suited to the reality that both sides generally anticipate
an ongoing, dynamic relationship.
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This Article recasts employment as a bilateral contract terminable at
will by either party upon reasonable notice. Establishing a reasonable
notice obligation will grant terminated workers paid transition time to
seek new employment and develop new skills. At the same time,
adopting this rule paves the way for a more unified body of contract
law. The case for deviations from general contract principles is
strongest where context-specific rules fulfill the reasonable expectations
of the weaker party. Employment-specific contract rules, as they
currently stand, do precisely the opposite. While ordinary contract law
cannot adequately protect workers’ interests in all circumstances, this
Article demonstrates that in at least some instances mainstream
doctrine, properly understood and applied, can produce results that are
both good for workers and in harmony with existing law.
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INTRODUCTION

Employment contract law is an outlier. And not in the way one
might expect. Because workers are generally in positions of
dependence, one would anticipate that the law of employment contracts
would eschew strict application of contract principles in favor of giving
force to workers’ reasonable expectations. Certainly, some of the highly
publicized decisions of 1980s employment contract jurisprudence,
viewed in isolation, can be characterized as manipulating the formalities
of contract formation in favor of finding liability on the part of the
employer.1 However, an overall examination of employment contract
1. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985)
(assigning contractual significance to employer personnel manual); Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc.,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that a contractually enforceable
promise of long-term security may be derived from the totality of the circumstances surrounding
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law reveals a very different landscape. Generally, judicial assumptions
about how contract principles apply to employment relationships are at
odds with contemporary, realist-inspired contract doctrine.2 The upshot
is that contemporary courts counterintuitively apply contract rules in
ways that leave workers worse off than commercial entities that deal
with financial equals.
This Article focuses on one example of this counterintuitive
distinction between the law of contracts and the law of employment
contracts—the absence of an affirmative obligation to provide notice of
termination under employment law. Under the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) and common law contracts cases outside of the
employment context, parties to an at-will relationship must provide
advance notice prior to exercising their right to terminate.3 In contrast,
employment relationships of indefinite duration are generally assumed
to be both terminable without reason and terminable without notice.
This Article aims to change that. It argues that the dominant
assumption that employment at will permits employers to terminate
workers without notice is neither historically accurate nor doctrinally
justified.4 Employment at will, as originally adopted, was a mere
the parties’ relationship). See generally Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 345
(1986) (observing that “some courts have found [enforceable employment] agreements under
circumstances that would probably garner a first-year Contracts student an F for saying that a
contract was formed at all”).
2. Particularly in recent years, there has been a move toward more formalistic
approaches to contract enforcement, most notably with respect to judicial deference to
employer-drafted disclaimer language. Contemporary courts are generally willing to credit
boilerplate language reciting that employment is at will and disclaiming contractual liability for
arbitrary termination, even in the face of competing evidence of contractual commitment. See,
e.g., Grossman v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305–06 (D. Conn. 2000);
Finch v. Farmers Co-op Oil Co. of Sheridan, 109 P.3d 537, 541–42 (Wyo. 2005); Guz v.
Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1094–95 (Cal. 2000); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473
N.W.2d 268, 271 (Mich. 1991). See generally Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Employment as
Transaction, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 447, 469 (2009) (describing courts’ willingness to
rubberstamp employer-drafted disclaimers in personnel manuals); Jonathan Fineman, The
Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345,
351–52 (2008) (discussing the limitations of the implied contract theory in light of employers’
ability to insist on their preferred express terms).
3. See U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (2012) (“Termination of a contract by one party except on the
happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other
party . . . .”); infra Section III.A.
4. The doctrinal theories proposed in this Article would necessarily give rise to a
reciprocal obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination—both terminating employers
and departing employees would be required to provide advance notice. However, the amount of
notice required would vary depending on the factual circumstances. See infra Section V.A. It is
therefore likely that the notice obligations of employees who voluntarily quit would be minimal
compared to those of terminating employers. This Article also assumes that a common law right
to advance notice of termination will be more valuable to and more frequently invoked by
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duration presumption supplied in the absence of an express term
regarding the length of the engagement.5 Nothing in the original
articulation of the rule or its subsequent adoption or expansion by courts
compels the conclusion that employers may terminate without advance
warning. In fact, general contract law, viewed outside the lens of
employment at will, suggests precisely the opposite. Reasonable notice
is at a minimum the doctrinally appropriate default term for the
termination of indefinite contractual relationships. It is also an integral
component of the duty of good faith and an implied term necessary for
the recognition of an enforceable contract.6 Such theories suggest that
reasonable notice is not just the proper default for at-will employment
relationships, but rather a rule of indefinite contracts from which parties
have only limited ability to deviate.7
In this way, the argument presented in this Article is prescriptive but
non-normative. There are numerous reasons why the law ought to
require employers to provide advance notice of termination.8 Advance
notice can be seen as a matter of fundamental fairness. Most workers
rely on their employers as their sole source of income, and a sudden
disruption in that flow of income takes an enormous personal and
financial toll. Providing advance notice of termination gives the worker
a paid window in which to seek alternate work and potentially avoid (or
at least mitigate) the period of time she or he is without income.9 A
notice requirement may also be socially beneficial. Employees who
employees than employers. Employers are generally well equipped to withstand the loss of a
single employee and are therefore unlikely to be able to show more than minimal damage in
routine cases. They are also likely to be deterred from pursing claims by the practical
impediments to recovering from an individual defendant. For these reason, this Article focuses
principally on advance notice given by employers to involuntarily terminated employees,
recognizing however that, in certain cases involving the defection of highly valuable employees,
the theories advanced here would be available to the employer in pursing rights against former
employees.
5. See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(John D. Parsons, Jr. ed., 1877).
6. See infra Sections III.B–C.
7. The degree to which the parties may alter the proposed reasonable notice rule, I will
contend, depends on the doctrinal foundation for its adoption. If reasonable notice is treated as a
contract “gap filler,” it is vulnerable to employer efforts to contract back into a “no notice”
regime. See infra Section III.A. However, there are additional contractual bases for implying a
reasonable notice rule into at-will employment relationships under which parties’ abilities to
avoid that obligation through drafting would be limited. See infra Sections III.B–C.
8. The arguments that follow are summarized from my prior work on this subject. See
Rachel Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause to Just Notice in Reforming Employment
Termination Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW passim (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) [hereinafter ArnowRichman, From Just Cause]; Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment
At Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1 passim (2010) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Just Notice].
9. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 37.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2

1518

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

receive notice are less likely to require unemployment insurance or
other government benefits.10 Finally, notice may effectuate parties’
implicit understanding of the terms of their relationship. While the days
of lifetime employment with a single company have past, employers
still make implicit promises to their workers, including the promise that
they will receive skills and training that will keep them marketable.11 A
notice rule translates that promise into a legal obligation, requiring
employers to underwrite the costs of its workers’ transition, positioning
them to better take advantage of their skills in the inevitable situation of
job loss.12
Arguments such as these have given rise to existing legislative
inroads into employment at will, such as plant closing laws that require
advance notice in the case of mass terminations.13 They have also been
invoked in calls to replace employment at will with a “just cause” rule,14
and could support a general statute requiring notice.15 I have explored
these arguments, and their limitations,16 at length elsewhere. My aim
here is narrower and more pragmatic. My argument is not that a notice
requirement is normatively grounded, but rather that it can be
doctrinally supported, and indeed, may be doctrinally compelled. In this
way, this Article lays a foundation for litigation seeking judicial
recognition of a right to reasonable notice of at-will termination.
At a more abstract level, however, this Article makes a claim about
the viability of contract-based solutions to issues of worker protection
10. See Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra note 8, at 321.
11. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 32–33.
12. See id. at 39.
13. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–09
(2006), requires large employers to provide sixty days’ advance notice to workers who will be
affected by a plant closing or mass layoff affecting a large portion of the workforce. See id.
§§ 2101(a)(2)–(3), 2102.
14. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404–05 (1967)
(emphasizing employee vulnerability in calling for just cause reform); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56,
65–66 (1988) (offering the view that replacing employment at will with a just cause rule “is a
matter of simple justice” and that there is “little or nothing to be said in favor of an employer’s
right to treat its employees arbitrarily or unfairly”); Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in
the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 77–78 (2000)
(arguing that the employment at-will rule results in the subordination of workers).
15. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 35–37.
16. For instance, an important countervailing policy consideration in contemplating
adoption of a notice of termination rule is the extent to which it will impose additional costs on
employers that may ultimately translate into fewer jobs, lower wages, or both. I explore these
possibilities in From Just Cause, supra note 8, at 319–22, concluding that the costs of a notice
requirement will be less than the amount of wages paid by employers during the notice period
and that employers are unlikely to be able to fully pass such costs on to workers in the form of
lower wages.
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and the relationship between contract and employment law generally. It
has been observed that employment is anticontractual both in its
application of employment at will and its treatment of other contract
rules.17 Yet to date, no scholar has delineated a competing vision of
employment at will that better aligns with contract doctrine while
enhancing common law protection for workers. This Article fills that
gap. It argues that employment contracts should be “mainstreamed,”
that is, analyzed consistent with contract principles of general
applicability. Basic contract interpretation principles offer a doctrinal
foundation for requiring employers to provide notice of termination,
much as the law does for other contracting parties.18 In so doing, this
Article claims neither that contract law should be exceptionally
generous toward workers nor that contract law can adequately protect
workers’ interests in all cases. Rather it argues that contract doctrine,
properly understood and applied, can produce better results for workers,
while bringing the law of employment more in line with the law of
contracts.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I revisits the history of
employment at will, focusing on issues of notice rather than cause. It
argues that whatever the origin or the accuracy of the American rule
permitting employers to terminate without reason, the at-will rule never
clearly embraced the idea that employment may be terminated without
notice. Part II surveys the contemporary law regarding notice of at-will
17. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125 (1976) [hereinafter Feinman, Employment At Will] (describing the
employment at will rule as a “departure” from “pure [contract] doctrine” and noting that “[i]f
the law on duration of service contracts had followed the teachings of pure contract theory, the
agreement established by the parties would have been enforced [and all evidence of party intent
would have been considered]. . . . But the contract approach was never implemented because of
the rise of employment at will”); W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does
Contract Law Conflict with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 12 (2003) (arguing
that courts’ treatment of the enforceability of employer modifications of binding personnel
manuals reflects a “misunderstanding [of] existing contract law” that defeats employees’
reasonable expectations, and creates bad public policy without enhancing employers’ ability to
alter their contracts); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
1082, 1098–99 (1984) [hereinafter Summers, Contract of Employment] (describing the concept
that “additional consideration” is required to overcome the presumption of employment at will
as a “spurious contractual doctrine” and arguing that “[a]s any first semester law student
knows . . . one performance can be consideration to support two or even twenty promises” and
that “[t]he work performed could be consideration for both the wages paid and the promise of
future employment”).
18. Since Section III.C presents, among the various legal foundations supporting a
reasonable notice term, one that would treat notice as the requisite consideration for an
enforceable indefinite contract, I will refer to reasonable notice in mandatory language—as a
requirement, obligation, or duty—recognizing the possibility that a court might choose to adopt
reasonable notice as a mere presumption or default term. See infra Section III.A.
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termination. Contrary to what scholars assume, there is only minimal
case law authority for the proposition that employers may terminate atwill employees without notice, and there is precedent in a handful of
jurisdictions to support the conclusion that parties to at-will
employment contracts are in fact obligated to provide reasonable notice
of termination. Part III lays the contact law foundation for reinterpreting
employment at will to include a reasonable notice obligation. It argues
that various principles of contract interpretation—the use of judicially
or legislatively supplied “gap fillers,” the notion of a robust implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the willingness of courts to
imply consideration to create enforceable obligations—support an
understanding of employment at will that embraces an obligation to
provide advance notice of termination. Part IV shows how employment
law has inexplicably deviated from this basic understanding of contract
law and demonstrates how employment contract law can be
“mainstreamed” without sacrificing the substantive discretion afforded
to employers under employment at will. Part V explores some of the
limitations of the proposed reinterpretation of the common law,
including the likelihood that employers will attempt to reimpose a “no
notice” regime though standard form contracts. It suggests that this risk,
coupled with other practical limitations of a reasonable notice rule, may
be best resolved through clarifying legislation.
I. A REVISED HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
Scholars have long debated the origin and accuracy of the
employment at-will rule.19 Most agree that courts’ wide-scale adoption
of the doctrine in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries owes at
least in part to treatise writer Horace Wood, who in 1877 famously
penned the “inflexible” proposition that in the United States, “a general
or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will.”20 Several scholars
have called into question the accuracy of Wood’s statement as a
reflection of then-prevailing law.21 This critique, however, has done
little to advance broader claims about the desirability of changing the atwill rule. Since almost every jurisdiction has judicially embraced
19. See generally Daniel P. O’Gorman, The Statute of Frauds and Oral Promises of Job
Security: The Tenuous Distinction Between Performance and Excusable Nonperformance, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 1023, 1044–45 (2010) (summarizing the literature).
20. See WOOD, supra note 5, § 134, at 272.
21. See, e.g., Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 126–27; Jay M. Feinman,
The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 735–37
(1991) [hereinafter Feinman, Revisited]; Summers, Contract of Employment, supra note 17, at
1083; J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974); see also Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will
in New York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 970
(1985) (“Commentators now agree that Wood invented his own rule.”).
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Wood’s statement of the law, it is now firmly ensconced, and inquiries
into the origin of the rule provide little insight.22 In addition, the
historical critique of Wood’s rule comprised part of a larger movement
in legal scholarship supporting the adoption of a “just cause” rule in
place of the prevailing rule permitting employers to terminate for any or
no reason.23 Unsurprisingly, this movement gained little traction outside
academic circles because it targeted the part of the at-will doctrine that
courts most clearly embraced and employers most revered.24
What has escaped wide notice is that there is a far more vulnerable
component of the employment at-will rule, one that has even less
historical foundation and judicial support—the idea that employers may
terminate without notice. A reexamination of Wood’s rule and the
precedents at the time reveal minimal support for the idea that the right
to terminate at will (that is, at any time for any reason) was coextensive
with a right to terminate without prior notice. Thus, the employment atwill rule is, as some scholars suggest, vulnerable from a historical and
doctrinal perspective, albeit in a different way and for a different reason.
This Part places Wood’s articulation of the employment at-will rule
in the context of the historical law regarding notice of termination. It
demonstrates that Wood’s rule and the precedents he cited primarily
served to reject the English “one-year presumption.” Wood did not
articulate a “no notice” rule, nor did the then-prevailing law clearly
embrace such a principal. Thus, the rule on notice of termination—a
question distinct from that of contract duration—remained unresolved
22. By the early twentieth century, most states in the union had explicitly adopted
employment at will. See Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A
Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 708 (2006); Andrew P. Morriss,
Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will,
59 MO. L. REV. 679, 717–20 (1994). See Montana later adopted a statutory just cause rule
superseding the common law at-will doctrine. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -15 (West 2013). Most scholars agree about the current state
of the law, irrespective of their views on its origin. See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread
of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards,
75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 460 (2008); Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the
Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457,
461–62 (1979). See generally Summers, supra note 14, at 67–68 (conceding that employment at
will is “embedded in American law”).
23. For examples of scholarship in this vein, see generally, Blades, supra note 14, at
1404–05, 1410; Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change
in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1979); St. Antoine, supra note 14, at 65–66; Summers, supra
note 14, at 77–78.
24. It also encountered serious backlash within some academic circles, notably by those
legal scholars working in the law and economics tradition. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 948–51 (1984); Andrew P. Morriss,
Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1901, 1901–02 (1996); J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term
Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 841–42.
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subsequent to Wood’s treatise and judicial adoption of his rule.
A. Notice to Terminate in Wood’s Rule
Critiques of Wood’s rule generally take issue with the authority he
cites in his treatise and the degree to which it supports the existence of
an at-will rule.25 Whether Wood was “right” about these precedents
depends largely on what one thinks he was trying to prove. Although it
is generally thought of and treated as a single rule, employment at will
is a multipart doctrine from which three distinct principles can be
derived: (1) a presumption that employment is of indefinite duration,
what this Article refers to as the “indefinite duration” rule; (2) a
presumption that employers may terminate for any or no reason, what
this section refers to as the “substantive discretion” rule; and (3) a
presumption that employers may terminate without notice or warning,
what this Article refers to as the “procedural discretion” rule.26
Historically the notion of employment at will existed only in the first
sense of the term, that is, it supplied a mechanism for determining the
duration of a contract in the absence of an express term.27 In the early
nineteenth century, the law of England followed the “one-year
presumption” under which employment of indefinite duration was
presumed to endure for one year.28 The reason for the presumption is
25. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 126; Feinman, Revisited, supra
note 21, at 737–39; Summers, Contract of Employment, supra note 17, at 1083; Shapiro &
Tune, supra note 21, at 341. But see Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful
Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1990) (countering that
“Wood relied on four American cases for his black letter rule, and notwithstanding the persistent
assertions to the contrary, these cases do indeed support the principle for which Wood cited
them”).
26. Although courts often describe employment at will as a “presumption,” I refer to the
doctrine and its three components as “rules,” as do other scholars, recognizing that in light of
how courts have interpreted and applied the doctrine, it is extraordinarily difficult for employees
to demonstrate that employment is other than at will. See, e.g., Matthew Finkin, et al., Working
Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts:
Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 110 (2009) (“[Employment] at-will is either a
rebuttable presumption that is almost irrebuttable or a default rule that tends toward an
immutable rule”); Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 677 (1996) (noting that “the presumption of at-will
employment was applied [by early twentieth century courts] with such vigor that it was virtually
impossible to overcome”); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
1082, 1097 (1984) (asserting that “courts transformed Wood’s presumption into a virtual rule of
law . . . made nearly irrebuttable by [their requirement] that the parties expressly agree to a
definite term”).
27. WOOD, supra note 5, § 134, at 272
28. Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 119–20; Sanford M. Jacoby, The
Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical
Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 95 (1982).
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often attributed to a desire to support the mutual interests of employers
and employees in an agrarian economy. By holding both sides to a oneyear contract, the worker was ensured a continuous stream of income
during the idle winter months, while the employer could rely on a
supply of available labor during peak planting and harvesting seasons.29
Although the presumption was never limited to agricultural workers,
the advent of an industrialized economy put pressure on the doctrine
both in the United Kingdom, where it originated, and in the United
States, where courts frequently relied on British law, such that in time
courts abandoned it.30 In the United Kingdom, courts moved toward the
use of notice periods, under which parties could terminate at any time
with sufficient advance warning.31 The same practice developed in
Canada, which also took its cues from British law.32 By contrast, in the
United States courts moved toward the presumption that employment
was terminable at will, that is, terminable at any time absent proof of a
defined period of engagement.33 The American trend toward at-will
employment neither took a position on the use of notice periods nor
precluded a reading that would require notice.
The precedents relied on by Wood reflect the move away from the
one-year presumption toward an indefinite duration rule, and to that
extent his defenders are correct that his cases support his assertion.34
However, Wood’s rule and the precedents he cites are either silent or
ambiguous on the other aspects of employment at will. They provide no
clear support for the idea that employment can be terminated without
29. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 120 (“The [one-year
presumption] expressed a sound principle: injustice would result if . . . [the employer] could
avoid supporting [employees] during the unproductive winter, or if [employees] . . . could leave
their [employer] when their labor was most needed.”); Jacoby, supra note 28, at 90 (citing
Blackstone’s attribution of the presumption to “a principle of natural equity, that the servant
shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective
seasons, as well when there is work to be done as when there is not”); Brian Etherington, The
Enforcement of Harsh Termination Provisions in Personal Employment Contracts: The Rebirth
of Freedom of Contract in Ontario, 35 MCGILL L.J. 459, 471 (1990) (“The [one-year]
presumption meant that a master who had employed a servant through the growing or
production season had to maintain him for the rest of the year . . . .”). This is not to suggest that
benevolence was the principal motivation for the presumption. Concerns about the cost of
poverty relief and the economic threat of labor disruptions were arguably more significant
factors. See id.; Jacoby, supra note 28, at 90.
30. Jacoby, supra note 28, at 97–98, 101, 106.
31. See id. at 100–01.
32. See Etherington, supra note 29, at 471.
33. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 125–26. Over time, courts also
made it increasingly difficult for litigants to overcome that presumption by limiting the type of
evidence that could be presented to support the existence of a different contractual
understanding. See Feinman, Revisited, supra note 21, at 736–39.
34. Freed & Polsby, supra note 25, at 554.
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reason, the substantive discretion rule.35 In addition, and more
importantly for present purposes, they fail to support a procedural
discretion rule, one that sanctions termination at any time and without
any notice. Indeed, to the extent Wood’s cases say anything about
notice, they tend to support the view that notice of at-will termination
must be provided.
Wood’s cases are a motley bunch. Only two of the four—Tatterson
v. Suffolk Manufacturing Co.36 and Franklin Mining v. Harris37—are
truly employment cases. These are probably more fairly characterized
as “jury question” cases rather than at-will cases—both affirm verdicts
in favor of terminated employees who argued successfully that their
employment was to endure for at least one year.38 To the extent the
cases reject any presumption of a one-year term or a term corresponding
to the employee’s pay period, they implicitly support the conclusion that
a contract is presumed to be terminable at will unless the totality of facts
demonstrates otherwise.
Neither case, however, addresses the question whether notice of atwill termination is required.39 In fact, in Tatterson, the court implicitly
treated notice as a condition on the employer’s ability to terminate.40 In
that case the employee was fired three months after his employer
advised him that the business would be closing and that he should find
other work.41 The defendants requested a jury instruction that the
“plaintiff was not entitled to more than three months’ notice [and t]hat,
if the jury were satisfied that the plaintiff was noti[f]ied . . . that the
mills would stop in October and all the employees be
discharged . . . then the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.”42 The
court found for the plaintiff–employee, presumably accepting his
position that the contract was for a full year. Thus, while the case is at
least consistent with an indefinite duration rule—the onus is on the
employee to prove a one-year entitlement—it does not support any

35. In some of the cases, the employer had a good reason to terminate, in others the
reasons are opaque, but in no case does the employee allege or the facts suggest that the
employer had a poor or arbitrary reason for its decision.
36. 106 Mass. 56 (1870).
37. 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
38. See id. at 116–17; Tatterson, 106 Mass. at 59.
39. In Tatterson, the court refused to consider a separate notice issue posed by the
defendant—whether it had the right to prematurely terminate the employee, even if he was
subject to a year-to-year agreement, upon the provision of proper notice—because this defense
was not raised below. Tatterson, 106 Mass. at 59.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 57.
42. Id.
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other aspect of employment at will.43 If anything, the case suggests that
an employer’s right to terminate, irrespective of the contract’s term, is
subject to an obligation to provide advance notice.
The other two cases do not lend themselves to easy characterization.
One is tangentially about employment, while one is about military
contracts; neither addresses the employer’s right to terminate without
reason or without notice. In De Briar v. Minturn, the plaintiff received a
monthly salary and a room at the employer’s inn.44 Upon dismissal, the
innkeeper notified the plaintiff that he should vacate his room by the
end of the month, which he refused to do.45 The parties did not question
the innkeeper’s right to terminate, and to that extent, the case could be
said to support employment at will.46 The issue before the court was
whether the innkeeper could evict the plaintiff by force when he failed
to vacate.47 As in Tatterson, the court did not address the question of
prior notice, either with respect to termination of the employment or the
tenancy. However, it is clear that the employer did provide advance
notice, at least with respect to the latter.48
The final case, United States. v. Wilder,49 could be said to cut in the
other direction. The dispute involved an 1861 government contract for
the periodic conveyance of supplies between a military storehouse and
Fort Abercrombie in the Dakota Territory.50 Several years into the
contract, upon being requested by the quartermaster to make an exigent
delivery, the plaintiff insisted that the military increase its price due to
increased “Indian hostilities.”51 The quartermaster orally agreed, but the
government subsequently refused to pay more than the original price.52
The court found for the plaintiff and awarded the balance owed.53
Wood and his defenders take from Wilder that contracts can be
terminated at will, and by the same token one could conclude from the
case that such at-will terminations can occur without notice.54 Yet
43. To the extent there was any discussion of the reason for termination, it was undisputed
that the termination owed to the cessation of the defendant’s business. See id. at 57, 60.
44. 1 Cal. 450, 451 (1851).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id. It is not clear from the facts whether advance notice of termination was provided.
It is also unclear how much advance notice of the eviction was provided, though it was less than
one month.
49. 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev’d, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 254 (1871).
50. Id. at 466–67.
51. Id. at 467.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 468.
54. I set aside the obvious question whether a case involving a military contract has any
bearing, even by analogy, on the law of employment termination, an issue disputed by other
scholars. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 25, at 555. One should note that besides the obvious
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nothing in the court’s opinion, which contains no legal analysis,
compels that conclusion.55 A better reading of Wilder is that the contract
did not terminate at all, but rather was modified in light of a force
majeure.56 Where extreme changes in outside circumstances not
predictable to the parties fundamentally change the cost of performance,
modern courts generally hold that a fair and equitable modification
agreed to by the parties is enforceable notwithstanding the parties’ prior
commitment.57 Under this view of the case, even if the original contract
in Wilder was still in effect at the time of the price increase, it was not
terminated at will by the plaintiff, but rather was equitably modified by
both parties in light of the prevailing circumstances.
The upshot is that, whatever one’s view of Wood’s rule and its
provenance, Wood’s articulation of the American employment at-will
doctrine did not embrace any particular rule regarding notice of
termination, nor did the cases on which he relied. In one of Wood’s
precedents, there is no mention of notice whatsoever.58 In two, the facts
indicate that the terminating party provided advance notice to the
plaintiff, although notice was not an issue in dispute.59 In the fourth
case, and the one most factually distinguishable from the employment
substantive differences between the two contexts, the contract in Wilder was for multiple
individual deliveries rather than a continuous performance like employment. See Wilder, 5 Ct.
Cl. at 467.
55. The issue, as framed by the parties, was whether the original contract was still in
effect when the new price was negotiated. See Wilder, 5 Ct. Cl. at 468. The defendant argued
that the transporter had failed to provide “reasonable notice” of termination, while the plaintiff
argued that the agreement terminated after one year pursuant to statutory law concerning
military contracts. See id. at 463–65. The result in favor of the plaintiff could as easily have
been based on the conclusion that the original contract had expired by statute as on the principle
that indefinite contracts can be terminated at will. A third possibility is that the court concluded
reasonable notice was given to the extent that the transporter notified the quartermaster of its
new price requirements before agreeing to the new transport.
56. The “Indian hostilities” referred to in the opinion were a series of battles between the
notorious Colonel Sibley and his army against a coalition of Native American tribes during and
in the aftermath of the Dakota War of 1862. See Paul Finkelman, “I Could Not Afford to Hang
Men for Votes.” Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, and the Dakota Pardons, 39 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 405, 417 (2013). Fort Abercrombie, the military’s transport destination under
the Wilder contract, was the stronghold supplying Sibley’s forces.
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981) (“A promise modifying a
duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding . . . if the modification is fair
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was
made . . . .”). In other words, such a modification does not run afoul of the preexisting legal duty
rule that requires “new” consideration to support the modification of an executory contract. See
id. § 73 (“Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the
subject of honest dispute is not consideration . . . .”).
58. See Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
59. See Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56, 59 (1870); De Briar v. Minturn, 1
Cal. 450, 451 (1851).
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context, the losing party unsuccessfully argued that it was entitled to
reasonable notice of contract termination.60 However, a fair reading of
the case suggests that the contract had not terminated at all but rather
had been voluntarily modified by the parties. In short, there is nothing
in Wood’s rule or in the cases he cites that suggests that employers may
terminate at-will employees without advance notice.
B. Notice to Terminate in Wood’s Time
Following the publication of his treatise, Wood’s rule became the
key source supporting the idea that an employment relationship has no
fixed duration and, ultimately, that parties enjoy complete substantive
discretion to terminate employment “at will.”61 However, no
comparable rule evolved regarding notice. Rather, the law, both at the
time of and subsequent to Wood’s rule, was unsettled.
The slim body of reported case law from the turn of the twentieth
century reveals at least three different approaches to notice of at-will
termination. A handful of decisions hold or suggest that termination of
an indefinite engagement could be effected without notice.62 For
instance, in Coffin v. Landis, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
permitted the immediate termination of an exclusive agency contract
between a landowner and his hired sales agent.63 The defendant
terminated the agreement several months after it was executed and
before the plaintiff was able to earn any commissions.64 In the
subsequent suit, the court explicitly rejected the plaintiff’s invitation to
apply the one-year presumption of English law.65 It instead held that the
agreement was terminable at the parties’ pleasure and that “no notice
was necessary.”66
Meanwhile, another group of cases from the same period hold the
opposite. In Harper v. Hassard, decided less than ten years after Coffin,
60. See Wilder, 5 Ct. Cl. at 465–66, 468.
61. See Summers, supra note 14, at 67–68.
62. See The Pokanoket, 156 F. 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1907) (rejecting a claim by a marine
engineer for wages for the remainder of the month, irrespective of whether he performed
satisfactorily, concluding that “the contract constitutes . . . a hiring at will, which could be ended
at any time, by either party, without notice”); Boyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246, 247–48
(E.D. Mo. 1903) (rejecting a claim by workers terminated without notice and blacklisted for
union activity, concluding that “in a free country like ours every employ[ee] . . . has the legal
right to quit the service of his employer without notice, and either with or without
cause, . . . [and] any employer may legally discharge his employ[ee], with or without notice, at
any time”); Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 434 (1864) (finding that an employer had the “right to
discharge [his sales agent employee] from his service at any time” without notice).
63. 46 Pa. at 434.
64. Id. at 431.
65. Id. at 433–34.
66. Id.
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the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts opined that “reasonable
notice” was required in the context of an at-will termination.67 There the
defendants engaged the plaintiff to prepare and instruct them in the art
of manufacturing color paints for a period not to exceed three years.68
Within a few months, the defendants grew disappointed with the
plaintiff’s skills and terminated him.69 The court held that because the
written agreement did not commit the parties to a three-year term, it was
an indefinite agreement and that consequently, “the defendants had the
right to elect to terminate . . . at any time by reasonable notice.”70
A third group of cases treat notice as a matter of custom. In
Hathaway v. Bennett, a New York court rejected a claim brought by a
newspaper carrier who was terminated without prior warning.71 The
court held that the carrier did not demonstrate a practice in the
newspaper industry of providing a month’s notice.72 Similarly, in Gray
v. Wulff, an Illinois court rejected a claim by a terminated orchestra
leader upon finding that his employer had provided one week’s notice.73
Absent a fixed term, the court observed, the employer–opera house “had
the right to discharge [the plaintiff] on giving him the usual and
customary notice . . . independent of the question whether he was
competent” to remain employed.74
As these cases indicate, there was no consistent rule in the United
States with respect to notice. Over time, employers developed the
practice of requiring employees to provide notice of voluntary
departure, largely in response to efforts at worker organizing.75 The
threat of breach of contract actions and wage withholding deterred
workers from engaging in sudden strikes and other job actions.76 Some
states passed laws effectively codifying a reciprocal notice requirement
by precluding employers from pursuing claims against their workers if

67. 113 Mass. 187, 190 (1873).
68. Id. at 189.
69. Id. at 188.
70. Id. at 190; see also Ward v. Ruckman, 34 Barb. 419, 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861)
(concluding that in the absence of a fixed duration, an employment contract with a vessel
captain was “subject to be terminated by either party on reasonable notice, if the interest of
either requires a change”); infra Section II.B (summarizing turn-of-the century Maryland case
law referring to a reasonable notice requirement).
71. 10 N.Y. 108, 110–11 (1854).
72. Id. at 113.
73. 68 Ill. App. 376, 377–78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1896).
74. Id. at 378; cf. The Pokanoket, 156 F. 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1907) (finding “no evidence of
any settled usage or custom of the port which would take the [marine engineer’s employment]
contract . . . out of the [general] rule” that “a hiring at will [can] . . . be ended at any time, by
either party, without notice”).
75. See Jacoby, supra note 28, at 107.
76. See id. at 106–07.
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they had not similarly contracted to provide notice of termination.77
Thus, for a time, a de facto employer notice obligation existed in the
United States. But as the threat of labor unrest dissipated, so too did
employer-imposed notice obligations and the reciprocal duty of
employers. Ultimately, companies preferred the freedom to terminate
without warning to the modest protection against concerted action and
sudden departures afforded by employee notice obligations.
In contrast, the law of the United Kingdom (and ultimately Canada)
evolved to affirmatively require notice of termination.78 As in the
United States, the advent of an industrial economy and the demand for
shorter-term employment put pressure on a rule designed primarily for
an agrarian society.79 However, British employers, faced with a more
significant threat of worker unrest, were unwilling to completely
abandon the idea of a contractual employment duration.80 By the midnineteenth century, the United Kingdom’s one-year presumption began
to be replaced by contracts of indefinite duration subject to notice, and
Canada followed suit.81 Although such notice periods were generally
short, often corresponding to the worker’s pay period, they continued to
serve the purpose of binding workers to their employers for a minimum
period of time. The resulting “implied reasonable notice term” was
ultimately codified in the United Kingdom, with the statute requiring
employers to provide a certain number of weeks’ notice (or its
equivalent in severance pay) per year of service.82 The Canadian
provinces similarly have statutory notice laws that set a “floor” for
notice of termination,83 although contemporary Canadian law also
maintains a common law reasonable notice obligation that may require
employers to provide additional notice or pay.84
In contrast, notice remained a loose thread in American employment
77. See id.
78. See Etheringon, supra note 29, at 472–73 (discussing development of the Canadian
rule); Jacoby, supra note 28, at 100–01 (discussing development of the English rule).
79. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 122–24; Jacoby, supra note 28, at
91. Another factor was the demise of British “settlement laws” that recognized individuals as
citizens of a particular parish and entitled to its protections provided they had a contract for at
least one year’s employment. Jacoby, supra note 28, at 88, 90; Etherington, supra note 29, at
471–72.
80. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 122.
81. See id. at 121–22.
82. See Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 86 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/section/86.
83. See, e.g., Ontario Employment Standards Act, S.O. 2000, c. 41, § 57 (Can.), available
at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_00e41_e.htm#BK103.
84. See Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. 2d 140, paras. 12–14 (Can. Ont.
High Ct. J.) (articulating the common law reasonable notice standard); GEOFFREY ENGLAND,
ESSENTIALS OF CANADIAN LAW: INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 290–96 (2d ed. 2008) (detailing
the interaction of common law and statutory notice requirements in Canada); infra Section V.A.
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termination law. A century after Wood’s rule, the at-will doctrine had
solidified as a substantive discretion rule permitting employers (and
employees) to terminate without reason. Implicitly, it has also been
understood as a procedural discretion rule permitting both parties to
terminate without notice. However, the history of employment
termination law both here and abroad demonstrates that there is no legal
or historical reason why the right to terminate without notice must
follow from the indefinite duration rule that Wood proposed.85 Indeed,
both Canada and the United Kingdom ultimately abandoned the oneyear presumption and adopted a legal regime that requires advance
notice.86
In short, U.S. law on notice was as ambiguous as the law of
employment duration at the time Wood articulated his rule. For better or
for worse, Wood’s treatise laid down a rule on the issue of duration, but
questions regarding notice remained open. As the next Part
demonstrates, contemporary courts, unlike their counterparts abroad,
have failed to pick up this issue, and the question of employee notice
rights remains open.
II. NOTICE AND THE CONTEMPORARY AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Since Wood’s time, there have been numerous developments in the
common law of wrongful discharge. However, there has been almost no
development in the law of notice. Unlike the idea that employers can
terminate without reason, the idea that termination may occur without
notice has not been explicitly and consistently articulated. Indeed,
judicial statements of the employment at-will rule that reference the
right of the parties to terminate without notice are the exception rather
than the rule. As this Part describes, the law of only ten states can be
characterized as purporting to allow employers to terminate at-will
employees without notice.87 In some jurisdictions the principle is found
in a single or small handful of cases, often in dicta and based on limited

85. Cf. Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 119 (noting that the “English,
unlike the Americans, saw that the questions [of the duration of the relationship and the length
of notice required to terminate it] were not the same and eventually developed a response to the
second that mitigated somewhat the strictness of the early response to the first”).
86. Although contemporary British law also imposes a universal just cause rule, see
Employment Rights Act §§ 94–98, outside a few provincial exceptions, Canada does not.
Canadian law uses the term “wrongful dismissal” to refer to a termination without notice and the
presence of cause supporting the employee’s termination is treated as a defense to his or her
claim. See ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 324. But Canadian employers may terminate without
cause if they provide the requisite notice. See id. at 65. Contemporary Canadian law thus
provides an example of how a system of mandatory notice can exist alongside a system of
substantive discretion reminiscent of American-style employment at will.
87. See infra Section I.A.
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analysis.88 On the other end of the spectrum, the law in three states can
be read to support an argument that employers are in fact required to
provide some amount of advance notice when terminating at-will
employees.89 These cases recognize a duty to provide “reasonable
notice” alongside employers’ basic right to terminate at-will workers for
any or no reason.
This Part reviews existing law on notice of termination in at-will
employment relationships.90 It reveals that procedural discretion—the
ability to terminate without notice—is not a settled or intrinsic aspect of
the employment at-will doctrine, but rather an open question distinct
from whether the relationship was at will in the substantive discretion
sense of the term. In fact, in most states there is no law that expressly
holds that employers may terminate without notice, while in those states
where “no notice” appears to be the rule, the issue remains ripe for
challenge.
A. “No Notice” States
It is often asserted that employment at will means employers can fire
for any or no reason, “with or without notice.”91 Yet research reveals
that there are relatively few jurisdictions that articulate the rule so
broadly. Nearly two-thirds of states do not reference “notice” at all in
their definition of employment at will.92 Cases in those jurisdictions
88. See infra Section II.A.
89. See infra Section II.B.
90. The research for this section consisted of a fifty-state survey of primarily state court
cases defining “employment at will” in the context of a wrongful termination claim brought by a
private sector worker with no express contract. I excluded from consideration those cases
involving public sector workers challenging an employer’s failure to provide notice as part of a
constitutional due process claim and those cases involving workers alleging breach of an
express contractual notice provision (usually, but not exclusively, in a written agreement).
91. Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of
Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 707 (2006) (“The basic rule, applied by the vast
majority of jurisdictions, concerning the at-will relationship—that either party may terminate the
relationship at any time, for any reason or no reason, and with or without notice—has been the
law in the United States for well over a century.”); John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The
Irreparable Damage of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145,
152 (1998) (“Pursuant to the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer can discharge a worker
for any legal reason or for no reason, with or without notice.”).
92. See infra Appendix A. Two of these “open” states, as I refer to them, require further
explanation. In Connecticut there is a contemporary decision rejecting an at-will employee’s
claim for negligent inflection of emotional distress in which the court observed that “lack of
advance warning or written notification is insufficient evidence that an employer acted
unreasonably in terminating an employee-at-will.” Thompson v. Bridgeport Hosp., No. CV
980352686, 1999 WL 1212310, *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1999). However, the decision,
which ruled on defendant’s motion to strike, addressed only the plaintiff’s negligence claim and
not her contract claims. In addition, the plaintiff had received both advance warning that her
department was closing and one month’s oral notice of her date of termination. In another of
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hold that employment is “at will,” but in explaining the doctrine state
only that parties can terminate for any or no reason. They do not go on
to add that termination may be with or without notice.93 Such
formulations clearly embrace the substantive discretion principle of
employment at will. Yet the process by which such discretionary
terminations are to be effected—with or without advance notice,
warning, or continuing obligations—is an open question in such
jurisdictions.
In contrast, only nine states have case law that arguably recognizes a
right to terminate at-will employment relationships without advance
warning. These “no notice” states have either held, stated, or implied
that an at-will employee may be terminated without notice.94
However, this is a generous classification. In many of these
jurisdictions, the no notice rule is neither well established nor well
supported. In three states—Colorado, Oregon, and Ohio—there are no
these states, New Jersey, there is an early twentieth century decision rejecting a claim of a city
contractor based on failure to provide notice of termination. See Miller v. Atlantic City, 74
N.J.L. 345, 346 (1907). While the court refers to the termination as “at will,” it appears that the
employee was terminated pursuant to a satisfaction clause in his written contract permitting
immediate termination upon his unreasonable delay. See id. 347. There appears to be no other
articulation of the employment at-will rule by a New Jersey state court that refers to the right to
terminate without notice. For these reasons, I characterize Connecticut and New Jersey as
“open” states in which the notice issue has not been decided.
93. Most jurisdictions do, however, define employment at will as the ability to terminate
“at any time.” One could argue that such language precludes an interpretation of employment at
will that requires the employer to supply advance notice, insofar as such an obligation delays the
time at which a firing can be effectuated. If the employer must provide notice, it is unable to
execute the termination immediately. This reading of “at any time” is unlikely however.
Although there appears to be no case elaborating on the phrase, it is notable that the words “at
any time” are not found exclusively in jurisdictions that explicitly adopt the “no notice” version
of employment at will. In fact, language referring to the employer’s ability to terminate “at any
time” can be found in the same jurisdictions, and sometimes in the same cases, that explicitly
refer to an obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination. See, e.g., Studer v. Hurley, 82
Va. Cir. 406, 407 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2011) (“One of the incidents of employment at will is the ability
of either party to terminate the relationship with or without cause at any time, upon giving
reasonable notice.”); Rubin v. Maloney, 75 Va. Cir. 452, 453 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007) (“Virginia has
long adhered to the common law doctrine of employment ‘at will’ where when a term of
employment cannot be determined from the contract, either party is at liberty to terminate the
contract at any time for any reason, upon reasonable notice.”); Neal v. Altoona Hosp., 38 Pa. D.
& C.3d 599, 601 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1985) (“An employment contract which has no definite
duration is a hiring at-will, and may be terminated upon reasonable notice by either party at any
time.”). The better understanding of “at any time” language is that it refers to the indefinite
duration rule, that is, it embodies the American rejection of the British one-year presumption.
94. There are an additional eight states with conflicting case law on this issue. See infra
Appendix A. The case law in these states includes decisions that either recognize or refer to an
obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination, as well as decisions that either explicitly
reject a reasonable notice claim or refer to employment at will as the right to terminate “with or
without notice.” The law of these jurisdictions is discussed infra Section II.C.
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reported state court decisions addressing a substantive claim by an atwill employee challenging the failure to provide notice of termination.
Rather, in these states, courts simply define at-will employment as the
ability to fire with or without reason and with or without notice.95 The
plaintiffs’ claims in these cases challenge only the reason for the
employer’s termination, not the absence of any advance warning or
severance pay. In other words, the “without notice” portion of the
courts’ rule statements in these cases is dicta.96
In another three jurisdictions, statutory law suggests, though it does
not explicitly state, that employment may not be terminated without
notice. The state statutes of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana
specifically provide that either party may terminate an at-will
employment relationship “on notice” to the other.97 These references
95. See, e.g., Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987) (en banc);
Bauserman v. Katy Steel & Alum. Co., No. WD-85-17, 1986 WL 1689, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986); Handam v. Wilsonville Holiday Partners, LLC, 201 P.3d 920, 923 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
96. In addition to being dicta, such “no notice” formulations of the at-will rule are often
unsupported by legal precedent. Courts generally cite early state supreme court decisions that
adopt employment at will, but which themselves contain no reference to notice of termination in
either the case facts or the court’s statement of the law. For instance, in Colorado, the language
“without notice” first appears in that state’s case law in Cont’l Air Lines, 731 P.2d at 711. All
subsequent court references to the ability to terminate without notice cite either Continental Air
Lines or cases citing Continental Air Lines. None of the cases cited by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Continental Air Lines, however, contain any reference to notice; each refers to
employment at will as the ability to terminate without reason. See Garcia v. Aetna Fin. Co., 752
F.2d 488, 491 (10th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1331, 1334
(D. Colo. 1983); Johnson v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Health, 662 P.2d 463, 471 (Colo. 1983);
Hughes v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 686 P.2d 814, 815 (Colo. App. 1984); Lampe v.
Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 590 P.2d 513, 514 (Colo. 1978); Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 530
P.2d 984, 985 (Colo. 1974). Thus, the Colorado “no notice” language is a judicial creation of the
last quarter century, one without support from any precedent in the state.
97. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (West 2014) (“An employment having no specified
term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other, except when otherwise
provided by this title.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-4 (“An employment having no specified
term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other, unless otherwise
provided by statute.”). Although Montana has legislatively overruled the substantive discretion
principle of employment at will, its “just cause” statute includes an exception for “probationary”
(i.e., at will) employees, which contains notice language identical to that in North Dakota and
South Dakota. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2)(a) (2000) (“During a probationary period
of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the
employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason.” (emphasis added)). In addition,
the Montana statute explicitly preempts common law contract claims. Id. § 39-2-913. Thus,
while employment at will is the exception rather than the rule in Montana, it is appropriate to
conclude that Montana employers have both substantive and procedural discretion with respect
to at-will employees.
A fourth state, California, has a statute containing notice language similar to that in North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 2014) (“An
employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to
the other. Employment for a specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on
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suggest that the terminating party must notify the losing party, that is,
make the employee aware of its decision. An explicit requirement of
actual notice could be said to belie any requirement of advance notice,
and at least a few courts in Montana have seemingly made that
assumption.98
In each of the remaining three states, there is at least one state court
decision that rejects a challenge to the failure to provide notice of
termination in an at-will employment relationship. In only one of these
states, Hawaii, the relevant case is on point and the ruling is explicit,
although the decision is old and the reasoning spare. In 1920, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected a notice claim in Crawford v.
Stewart, a one-page decision containing no explanation of the case
facts.99 The full explanation of its decision is as follows:
In answer to plaintiff’s contention that the majority opinion
overlooked the fact that no notice whatever was given of
any intention to terminate the contract we hold that the
requirement of such notice would abrogate entirely the
main principle laid down in our opinion to the effect that a
hiring for a stipulated sum per month without anything
further being agreed upon to fix the term of hiring
constitutes an indefinite hiring and is terminable at the will
of either party.100
Explicit though it may be, this precedent is an isolated decision. There
appears to be no reported state court decision referencing the ability to
terminate without notice since Crawford was issued nearly one hundred
years ago.
notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater
than one month.”). However, there is case law in California that presumes the existence of a
common law “reasonable notice” requirement. See, e.g., Consol. Theatres, Inc., v. Theatrical
Stage Emps. Union, Local 16, 447 P.2d 325, 337 (Cal. 1968) (stating that seven months
constituted reasonable notice of termination of union contract between theater and stagehand
employees). For this reason, I classify California as a “reasonable notice” state. See infra
Section II.B.
98. See Scott v. Eagle Watch Invs., Inc., 828 P.2d 1346, 1350 (Mont. 1991) (holding that
the employer met the statutory notice requirement by informing the athletic club manager that
his employment was terminated); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Mont.
1982) (asserting that Montana statutory law “does not require prior notice”). Both Scott and
Gates were decided under Montana’s employment at-will rule, which was in effect prior to the
passage of the Montana Wrongful Discharge in Employment Act (MWDEA). That statute
contained notice language identical to what appears in the probationary employee exception to
the MWDEA. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1986) (“Except as limited in this part,
employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of either the employer or
the employee on notice to the other for any reason considered sufficient by the terminating
party.”).
99. 25 Haw. 300, 300–01 (1920).
100. Id. at 300.
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In the remaining two states—Alabama and Michigan—the law is
somewhat more opaque. The state court decisions that sanction
termination at will without notice to the losing party are factually
idiosyncratic. For instance, in the only Alabama case to reference notice
of at-will termination, Allied Supply Co., Inc. v. Brown, the employer
sued its former employees arguing that they had breached their
fiduciary duties by, among other things, conspiring to depart en masse
without warning.101 The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the
principle of employment at will precluded an interpretation of the
fiduciary duty doctrine that would prohibit employees from quitting
immediately: “Implicit in the ‘employment-at-will’ doctrine is the
concept that an employee at will can be discharged, or, conversely, can
terminate his employment, without prior notice.”102 Thus, while the
court was explicit about the right to terminate at-will relationships
without notice, it made such assertions in the context of protecting an
employee’s right to quit and engage in postemployment competition.
In the Michigan case, Garavaglia v. Centra, the primary issue was
not notice but whether the plaintiff’s consulting contract contemplated a
fixed or indefinite period of employment.103 Although the Michigan
appellate court found that the contract was at will, it affirmed the trial
court’s award of two quarters’ retainer fees to the plaintiff, concluding
that the plaintiff had not been properly notified that the contract had
been cancelled.104 Explaining this decision, the court made clear that
parties need not provide prior notice of termination under employment
at will:
Defendants correctly note that in cases of employment
terminable at will, notice is not required by either party.
However, such notice relates to the advance warning of
intended action. While defendants were not required to give
advance notice of their intentions to terminate the parties’
agreement, defendants should have notified plaintiff that
the contract was terminated.105

101. Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 35 (Ala. 1991).
102. Id. In support of its conclusion, the court cited three other Alabama Supreme Court
cases, all of which refer to employment at will as the right to terminate “with or without cause
or justification,” and contain no reference to notice. See Bell v. S. Cent. Bell, 564 So. 2d 46, 48
(Ala. 1990); Bailey v. Intergraph Corp., 537 So. 2d 21, 21 (Ala. 1988); Martin v. Tapley, 360
So. 2d 708, 709 (Ala. 1978). It appears that no other state court decision has addressed the issue.
103. Garavaglia v. Centra, Inc., No. 196203, 1998 WL 1991630, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998).
104. Id. at *2, *4. Apparently the defendant stopped paying the plaintiff’s retainer fees, but
did not otherwise communicate that it considered the contract terminated, and the plaintiff
assumed that the defendant was merely late with his payment. Id. at *4.
105. Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
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Thus, while the court explicitly rejected the notion of an advance notice
requirement, the claim in the case rested on the failure to provide actual
notice of termination and the employee was awarded lost salary.106
In sum, while there is some case law asserting that at-will
termination may occur without advance notice, that law is neither as
prevalent nor as inviolate as one might expect. Only a small minority of
states have explicitly articulated a “no notice” rule, and several have
done so only in dicta. Where there is case law on point it is not
especially well analyzed or supported, and in several states, the relevant
cases are old and idiosyncratic. In short, the “no notice” rule, to the
extent it exists, is vulnerable to challenge.
B. Reasonable Notice States
In contrast, the law in a small handful of states appears to require
employers to provide “reasonable notice” of at-will employment
termination.107 The principal is neither well developed nor consistently
cited and applied. However, the existence of this admittedly slim body
of law offers a model for how an obligation to provide advance notice
of termination can comfortably exist alongside a right to terminate for
any or no reason.
In three jurisdictions—California, Maryland, and Florida—there is
state case law that either requires an employer to provide advance notice
of termination or refers to or assumes such an obligation in dicta.108 In
one of the three, there is no case precisely on point. In California, there
are cases that refer to “reasonable notice” of termination, but they do
not involve claims that specifically target the employer’s failure to
provide advance notice.109 Such judicial references to reasonable notice
are arguably no more reliable as a reflection of extant law than
references to the ability to discharge “with or without notice” in cases
that similarly involve general challenges to the employer’s reasons for

106. See id.
107. See infra Appendix A.
108. There are an additional eight states—Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia—with conflicting case law on this issue. See infra
Appendix A. The case law in these states includes decisions that either recognize or refer to an
obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination, as well as decisions that either explicitly
reject a reasonable notice claim or refer to employment at will as the right to terminate “with or
without notice.” The law of these jurisdictions is discussed infra Section II.C.
109. See, e.g., Consol. Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Emps. Union, Local 16, 447 P.2d
325, 337 (Cal. 1968) (stating that seven months constituted reasonable notice of termination of
union contract between theater and stagehand employees); Mile v. Cal. Growers Wineries, Inc.,
114 P.2d 651, 654 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (noting that, in an action by wine salesperson to
recover sales commissions, the employment contract was terminable at will upon reasonable
notice).
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terminating.110
However, the law in the remaining two states is more explicit.
Maryland case law includes a pair of turn-of-the-century decisions that
articulate and implicitly apply a reasonable notice rule. In Stubbs v.
Vestry of St. John’s Church, the plaintiff had served as a rector for over
twenty-two years when he was removed from office by resolution of the
vestry.111 The resolution was passed in May, effective the end of July.112
The state’s highest court held that the rector’s appointment contained no
fixed term of employment and consequently could be terminated at will
upon reasonable notice, which had been received.113 To a similar effect
is Bartlett v. Hipkins, also involving a rector, in which the plaintiff
received notice of termination on November 15, effective January 1.114
The court reversed an injunction in favor of the rector.115 Although the
court relied primarily on statutory law granting vestries the right to
choose their ministers,116 the concurring opinion in the case explained
the role of notice in tempering the effect of vestry authority:
[W]hile the vestry may have such right to terminate the
contract with the rector, the right must always be exercised
with due regard to the principles of justice, depending upon
the circumstances of the case. Reasonable notice is
essential . . . .117
The judge went on to note that reasonable notice (approximately six
weeks) had been given and was not challenged.118
The same principles can be found in the contemporary state court
decisions of Florida. The key case, Perri v. Byrd, involved a suit by
110. It is interesting to consider, however, that, the key California case referencing a
reasonable notice rule for indefinite employment contracts is a case involving a collective
bargaining agreement. Consol. Theatres, Inc., 447 P.2d at 328. In Consolidated Theaters, the
parties had entered into an agreement requiring, among other things, that the theater employ
union stagehands. Id. at 329. Subsequently, the theater transitioned from a live performance
venue to one showing motion pictures. Id. When union employees picketed because of the
theater’s failure to use stagehands, the court held that the contract was no longer binding and
that the union had effectively given “reasonable notice” of termination seven months prior when
it threatened to picket. Id. at 337. Thus, while there is no individual employment contract case in
California that holds that parties must provide reasonable notice of termination, there is such a
holding in the labor relations context. See id. But see, supra note 99 and accompanying text
(discussing California’s codification of employment at will which refers to termination “on
notice to the other” party).
111. 53 A. 917, 917 (Md. 1903).
112. Id. at 919.
113. Id.
114. 23 A. 1089, 1090 (Md. 1892).
115. Id. at 1093.
116. Id. at 1092–93.
117. Id. at 1093.
118. Id.
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members of a band against a restaurant that had hired the group to play
weekly over the summer.119 After the plaintiffs accepted the offer of
employment, but prior to their first performance, the band’s former
employer threatened to sue the defendant, prompting it to rescind its
offer.120 The band sued the new employer, seeking damages for the
amount it would have earned over the course of the summer.121
Reviewing a jury verdict in favor of the band, the Florida District Court
of Appeal rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the offer of employment
for the summer created a fixed term, finding the relationship one of
indefinite duration and therefore terminable at will.122 However, it held
that notwithstanding the defendant’s right to terminate at any time, it
was obligated to provide reasonable notice of termination.123 It went on
to conclude that two weeks’ notice was reasonable, based on
“customary” business practices, and awarded the band two weeks’
pay.124
This case law support for a reasonable notice rule is not robust. In
Florida, courts have cited and relied on Perri, but the universe of cases
challenging the failure to provide notice is small,125 and the issue has
119. 436 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Given the nature of the services
provided by the band, it would appear questionable whether a true employment—as opposed to
independent contractor—relationship was intended. However, this issue was not recognized by
the court (and presumably was not raised by the parties). The court opinion explicitly treats the
relationship as one of employment. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 361.
123. Id.
124. Id. The court subtracted the amount of money the band had earned at other venues
during the notice period from its damages award. Id.
125. See, e.g., Rehman v. ECC Int’l Corp., No. 90-425-Civ-Orl-22, 1993 WL 85758, at *1
(M.D. Fla. 1993) (stating that at-will employees may be entitled to payment equivalent to wages
earned in a reasonable notice period); Malver v. Sheffield Indus., Inc., 502 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the employer complied with the reasonable notice obligation
by providing the employee one week’s severance pay); Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., P.A.,
490 So. 2d 993, 996–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a prospective employee who
relocated from Britain for a job offer could be awarded damages arising from the accounting
firm’s failure to provide reasonable notice of termination of the employment offer); cf. Settle v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 91-0028-Civ-Orl-18, 1992 WL 210986, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 1992)
(noting that the employer provided four months’ advance notice of termination consistent with
its obligation to provide reasonable notice in rejecting employee’s claim that the employer
breached principles of good faith and fair dealing); Payroll, Inc. v. Elicker, 668 So. 2d 1035,
1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that where the employer terminated immediately
without notice, injuries sustained by the employee during the time period that would have
constituted reasonable notice of termination were considered to have occurred prior to
termination for purposes of workers compensation coverage. But see Motwani v. Oceancity Inv.,
Ltd., 682 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing without explanation that the
court’s refusal to allow a set-off to the plaintiff in awarding damages to the defendant conflicted
with Perri v. Byrd).
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never reached the state supreme court.126 In Maryland, it appears that no
state court has revisited the issue since Stubbs was decided over a
century ago. The point, however, is not that “reasonable notice” is the
de facto rule in any particular jurisdiction, but rather that it could be.
Cases like Stubbs and Perri, challenge the notion that the privilege to
terminate without notice is implicit in the doctrine of employment at
will. In each, the court presumes a system that allows parties subjective
discretion to terminate, but conditions the exercise of that right on a
degree of procedural fairness achieved through the provision of advance
notice.
C. Mixed Law States
In eight jurisdictions, the law regarding notice of at-will termination
is either unclear or in conflict. Like the law of most of the jurisdictions
discussed thus far, the case law in these “mixed law” states is limited
and often does not directly address the precise factual question. In two
states—Tennessee and Texas—there are decisions referring both to the
ability to terminate without notice and the need to provide reasonable or
some other form of notice.127 However, such language appears
exclusively in cases that do not involve actual challenges to the failure
to provide notice. Thus, in Texas, there are references to parties’ ability
to terminate “without notice or cause,”128 “on giving reasonable
notice,”129 on “reasonably short notice,”130 on “giv[ing] actual
126. The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged Perri, but deemed it inapplicable to the
facts in City of Homestead v. Beard, 600 So. 2d 450, 453–54 (Fla. 1992).
127. In Tennessee, compare Lee v. City of LaVergne, No. M2001-02098-COA-R3-CV,
2003 WL 1610831, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the police department employee
was an at-will employee who could therefore “be terminated for good cause, bad cause or no
cause at all, without notice”), with Roberts v. Fed. Express Corp., 1991 WL 104203, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (presuming that at-will employees are entitled to reasonable notice of
termination in concluding that a maintenance mechanic accused of stealing customer property
would not have been entitled to notice because he was terminated for cause). In Texas, compare
Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring) (stating that
human resources director’s status as an at-will employee who could be terminated without
notice or cause did not foreclose the possibility that she may have a viable claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress against her former employer for the way in which she was
terminated), with Island Lake Oil Co. v. Hewitt, 244 S.W. 193, 194–95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
(quoting general rule that “‘when a contract calls for the rendition of services, if it is so far
incomplete as that the period of its intended duration cannot be determined by a fair inference
from its provisions, either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at will on giving
reasonable notice of his intention to do so’” in holding that an oil driller’s employment contract
for indefinite duration was terminable circumstances implying actual notice of termination).
128. Wornick Co., 856 S.W.2d at 737; Tex. Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n v. Hale, 237 S.W.2d 769,
772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
129. Island Lake Oil Co., 244 S.W. at 195.
130. Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App. 1987).
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notice,”131 and “just by giving notice to the other [party],”132 sometimes
in the same case and absent any analysis. Such states are arguably no
different than “open states” with respect to the prevailing rule of law.
In four states—Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, and
Pennsylvania—there is turn-of-the-century case law addressing the
issue of notice, but more recent decisions suggesting a different rule.133
The more recent decisions in these jurisdictions, however, either contain
references to notice only in dicta or discuss the issue under inapposite
facts. In New York, for instance, there is a nineteenth century decision
recognizing that an employer owes terminated workers customary
notice,134 while a twentieth century decision involving employee
fiduciary duties concludes that at-will employees need not provide
notice prior to voluntarily terminating.135 In addition, the contemporary
131. Island Lake Oil Co., 244 S.W. at 194.
132. Mackey v. U.P. Enters., Inc., No. 12-99-00355-CV, 2005 WL 1798408, at *2 (Tex.
App. 2005) (quoting, and upholding as proper, the trial court’s instruction on the meaning of at
will); see also McKinney, 271 S.W. at 249 (holding that employment at will was terminable
without the other party’s consent “upon notice to that effect”).
133. In Massachusetts, compare Jackson v. Action for Bos. Cmty. Dev., Inc., 525 N.E.2d
411, 412–13 (Mass. 1988) (holding that, because employment center supervisor who had been
accused of sexual harassment was an at-will employee, he could be terminated “without notice[]
for almost any reason or for no reason at all”), with Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass. 187, 187–90
(1873) (holding that, after the contractually fixed term of employment expired, the employer
was free to terminate his “color maker” employee upon reasonable notice). In Missouri,
compare Boyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246, 247–48 (E.D. Mo. 1903) (rejecting a claim by
workers terminated without notice and blacklisted for union activity, concluding that “in a free
country like ours every employ[ee] . . . has the legal right to quit the service of his employer
without notice, and either with or without cause, . . . [and] any employer may legally discharge
his employ[ee], with or without notice, at any time”), with Paisley v. Lucas, 143 S.W.2d 262,
271 (Mo. 1940) (stating that insurance agent’s employment contract for an indefinite term was
terminable upon reasonable notice), and Clarkson v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 170 S.W.2d 407,
415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (noting, in an action to recover sales commissions, that a contract
between manufacturer and salesperson was terminable upon reasonable notice because it
included no provision for the intended period of duration). In Pennsylvania, compare Neal v.
Altoona Hosp., 38 Pa. D. & C. 599, 601 (1985) (reciting as the general rule that parties may
terminate at will “upon reasonable notice”), with Cofin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 434 (1864)
(finding that a sales agent could be terminated at will and that “no notice was necessary”). For
citations to conflicting decision in New York, see infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
See also supra Section I.B (discussing the historical law of these three states).
134. See Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108, 113 (1854) (accepting the principle that
customary notice is due to a terminated at-will worker, but finding that the plaintiff–newspaper
carrier had not established the custom of providing one month’s notice); see also Ward v.
Ruckman, 34 Barb. 419, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861) (stating that a vessel owner’s contract with
a ship captain “must be considered as subject to be terminated by either party on reasonable
notice”).
135. See Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724, 728
(N.Y. 1958) (holding that where an employer sued its former home cleaning employees who left
to start a competing business, notice by the former employees of their intent to leave would have
been a “courteous” gesture, but it was not required); see also Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d
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cases in these four jurisdictions neither address nor identify the
inconsistency with historical precedents. For these reasons, it is difficult
to characterize the law of these states as supporting either a “no notice”
or a “reasonable notice” rule.
In the remaining two states—Louisiana and Virginia—the
contemporary law is ambiguous or in conflict. The situation in
Louisiana is idiosyncratic. There the state code provides that contracts
of indefinite duration require reasonable notice of termination,136 but
courts and commentators are unclear as to when and whether this
admonition applies to employment relationships.137 In Virginia, by
contrast, there are contemporary decisions affirmatively recognizing an
obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination to at-will
employees alongside those specifically rejecting a reasonable notice
obligation.138
Since at least the early twentieth century, the reported case law in
Virginia has consistently defined employment at will as permitting
termination at any time and for any reason upon “reasonable notice.” As
the state supreme court stated in Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville
753, 755, 758–59 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that a doctor, employed as Associate Medical Director
by a newspaper, was subject to the at-will employment rule and could be terminated “at any
time without cause or notice”); Kotick v. Desai, 123 A.D.2d 744, 744–45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(holding that an employer’s promise of permanent employment to an orthodontist was merely
at-will employment permitting either party to terminate the relationship “without advance
notice”); Grozek v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 63 A.D.2d 858, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding that
an employee discharged for fighting with a coworker did not have an employment contract for a
specified term and thus he was an at-will employee who could be discharged at any time
“without advance notice”).
136. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (2013) (providing that a “contract of unspecified
duration” may be terminated at will by either party “by giving notice, reasonable in time and
form”).
137. Compare Carlson v. Superior Supply Co., 536 So. 2d 444, 446 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(asserting in an employment termination case that “[a] contract for an indefinite period is
terminable at the will of either party upon giving reasonable notice”); 6 EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 22:4 (West, updated Apr. 2014) (“Under the Louisiana Civil
Code[] . . . oral contracts for employment of indefinite duration are terminable at any time at the
will of either party upon reasonable notice.”), available at Westlaw EDC ANAREL § 22:4, with
Finkle v. Majik Mkt., 628 So. 2d 259, 260, 262 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that where an
assistant manager of a retail store had a “simple, at-will employment” relationship with his
former employer and there was “no specific contract between” the parties, Article 2024 did not
apply and the manager could be terminated without notice), and Harrison v. CD Consulting,
Inc., 2006 WL 1194749 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that an at-will employee was
not required to provide advance notice of departure in rejecting employer’s breach of fiduciary
duty claim). See generally La. Prac. Employment Law § 12:7 (2013-2014 ed.) (“Although Civil
Code art. 2024 requires notice ‘reasonable in time and form’ prior to termination, at-will
employment contracts generally require no notice of termination.”); infra Parts III.A and IV.A
(discussing Louisiana law).
138. For a summary of conflicting cases in Virginia, see infra, notes 140–43 and
accompanying text.
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& Nashville Railroad Co.:
[W]hen a contract calls for the rendition of services, if it is
so far incomplete as that the period of its intended duration
cannot be determined by a fair inference from its
provisions, either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate
it at will on giving reasonable notice of his intention to do
so.139
Initially, this formulation of the rule appeared exclusively in cases in
which notice was not explicitly at issue.140 Since the late 1980s,
however, the state circuit courts, primarily in unreported decisions, have
applied Stonega to notice-based claims. These courts find that
employees state a claim for breach of the at-will employment contract
where the employer terminates immediately without advance
warning.141 What constitutes reasonable notice in such cases is usually

139. Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 55 S.E. 551, 552 (Va. 1906)
(emphasis added).
140. See, e.g., Cnty. of Giles v. Wines, 546 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va. 2001); Doss v. Jamco,
Inc., 492 S.E.2d 441, 443 (Va. 1997); Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 421 S.E.2d 428, 429
(Va. 1992); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 798 (Va. 1985); Wards Co. v.
Lewis & Dobrow, Inc., 173 S.E.2d 861, 865 (Va. 1970); Stutzman v. C.A. Nash & Son, 53
S.E.2d 45, 49 (Va. 1949); Studer v. Hurley, 82 Va. Cir. 406, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2011); Rubin v.
Am. Soc’y of Travel Agents, Inc., 78 Va. Cir. 1, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008); Brehm v. Mathis, 59
Va. Cir. 31, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2002); Andrews v. Bon Secours-St. Mary’s Hosp. of Richmond,
Inc., 43 Va. Cir. 486, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997); Wilt v. Water & Wastewater Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n,
43 Va. Cir. 118, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997); Tingle v. Chasen’s Bus. Interiors, Inc., 41 Va. Cir.
451, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997); Parsley v. Jones & Frank Corp., 40 Va. Cir. 286, at *1 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 1996); Handley v. Boy Scouts of Am., 32 Va. Cir. 524, at *9 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992); Bowman v.
Rappahannock Elec. Coop., 13 Va. Cir. 290, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988).
141. See, e.g., Laudenslager v. Loral, 39 Va. Cir. 228, 229 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1996) (holding that
an employer’s failure to give its at-will employee reasonable notice of termination gave rise to
an action for breach of implied contract); Tingle, 41 Va. Cir., at *1, *3 (holding that a pregnant
employee who was fired without notice after slightly more than seven months of employment
could recover damages for her employer’s failure to provide reasonable notice of termination);
Slade v. Cent. Fid. Bank, N.A., 12 Va. Cir. 291, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) (holding that a teller
who was employed for twenty-four years was entitled to damages arising from the bank’s failure
to provide reasonable notice of termination); Braunfeld v. Forest Home Sys., 12 Va. Cir. 163, at
*3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) (holding that the jury properly awarded damages to the employee where
the employer failed to give reasonable notice of termination). Cf. Person v. Bell Atl.-Va., Inc.,
993 F. Supp. 958, 962 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that because telephone service technician’s
employment contract was governed by a collective bargaining agreement, his claim based on the
default at-will rule in Virginia requiring employers to provide “reasonable notice of
termination” was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act). It is possible that this
trend began long before the late 1980s but became more widely known only upon the advent of
electronic research offering access to what are primarily unreported decisions requiring
reasonable notice.
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left for the jury.142
Recent developments have called this law into question. A series of
cases applying Virginia law have rejected employee claims for failure to
provide reasonable notice, concluding that an obligation to provide
notice is antithetical to employment at will.143 Perry v. American Home
Products, a federal district court case, appears to have begun the
trend.144 American Home involved a chemist who had been employed
for twelve years prior to being terminated in a dispute over
pharmaceutical testing procedures.145 The plaintiff’s principal claim was
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; his secondary claim
was that the employer was liable for failing to provide notice of
termination, or as the court put it, that “the at-will-doctrine does not
apply when an employee is discharged without ‘reasonable notice.’”146
The court acknowledged the repeated references in Virginia’s case
law to reasonable notice of termination, but concluded that such
statements were fairly characterized as dicta.147 It noted that the
Supreme Court of Virginia had never applied its reasonable notice rule,
and had in fact strongly adhered to the at-will principle, recognizing
only limited exceptions to the doctrine.148 In contrast, the court asserted
that sanctioning a notice claim would “eviscerate the at-will doctrine
itself.”149 It explained:
No employee-employer relationship in Virginia could truly
be “at-will” if an at-will employee has a valid claim,
whether for breach of implied contract or in tort, when
reasonable notice is not given before termination. The
recognition of this new action would permit every
discharged employee to sue the employer on the theory that
142. See, e.g., Tingle, 41 Va. Cir., at *3 (holding that the length of a reasonable notice
period depends on the cause of discharge); Slade, 12 Va. Cir., at *1 (holding that “the defendant
can by bill of particulars or discovery discern the basis for plaintiff’s claim of damages due to
lack of reasonable notice”); Braunfeld, 12 Va. Cir., at *3 (rejecting defendant’s argument that an
employee must provide evidence to show what timeframe constitutes reasonable notice in a
given trade or industry and holding that the jury was well qualified—based on inferences drawn
from evidence, common sense, and collective experience—to determine what constituted a
reasonable notice period).
143. See, e.g., Perry v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 3:96CV595, 1997 WL 109658, at *8–
9 (E.D. Va. 1997); Rubin, 78 Va. Cir., at *3; Brehm, 59 Va. Cir., at *2.
144. See Perry, 1997 WL 109658, at *8–9 (explaining that “a ‘reasonable notice’ exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine would effectively eviscerate the at-will doctrine itself”).
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *3.
147. Id. at *8; see also Brehm, 59 Va. Cir., at *2–3 (asserting that prior decisions imposing
a reasonable notice requirement “rest upon taking a few words out of the definition of at will
employment” in rejecting reasonable notice claim).
148. Perry, 1997 WL 109658, at *3.
149. Id. at *9.
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the employer breached its implied duty to provide
reasonable notice. What is “reasonable” is a question of
fact, and thus every case filed would have to be decided by
the finder of fact.150
Noting that “serious policy considerations, affecting countless business
relationships” would be implicated in such a “substantial alteration” of
the rule, it concluded that the notice issue should be left to the state
legislature.151
The rationale for the court’s rejection of a reasonable notice rule is
revealing. American Home posits a fundamental inconsistency between
employment at will and notice, but its concerns are functional rather
than doctrinal. The supposed incompatibility derives from the risk of
litigation over reasonableness that would presumably chill employers’
exercise of substantive discretion. Such concerns are real, but the
analysis is incomplete. Courts can temper administrative challenges
through careful formulation of doctrine, and to the extent they cannot,
that is merely one of many policy considerations at stake in the
development of the at-will doctrine. Whatever burdens and costs it
might impose, reasonable notice also offers fair warning and a modest
income cushion to vulnerable workers. Such considerations, which go
unmentioned in American Home, may be worth the tradeoff.
For these reasons, it is not unreasonable to suggest, as American
Home does, that the legislature is the best body to formalize and
elaborate on a notice requirement. But such a preference does not
permit courts to sit idle. In fact, American Home’s reference to judicial
role is ironic. Prior to the district court’s decision, all Virginia state
court cases that had addressed the issue recognized a reasonable notice
claim, and the language on this point in Stonega, whatever the scope of
the issues in the case, is perfectly clear. The federal court’s choice to
take the law in a different direction based on such a limited analysis is
surprising at best.152 The employment at-will doctrine, and the
principles of contract law of which it is ostensibly a part, are ultimately
common law inventions. It is appropriate for state trial courts to
interpret that law to require parties to supply reasonable notice of
termination if such a reading is doctrinally justified. Part III argues that
it is.

150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915, 919 (Va. 1987)).
152. At worst, it is a violation of the Erie doctrine, which requires federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction to apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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III. THE CONTRACT CASE FOR NOTICE
Part II suggested that while the law is clear that employment at will
permits parties substantive discretion to determine whether to terminate,
the procedural obligations of the parties in executing termination are
unsettled. This Part takes the first step in building a common law case
for an obligation to provide reasonable notice of at-will employment
termination by appealing to general contract law. It identifies three
doctrines or legal theories through which courts interpreting
nonemployment contracts have imposed a reasonable notice obligation
on parties to an indefinite relationship: the use of reasonable gap fillers,
the implied duty of good faith, and the doctrine of consideration.
Although each of these approaches has an established doctrinal
foundation, they are not equal in terms of their potential to support a
robust entitlement to notice of termination in the employment context.
As will be seen, the law of contract gap fillers offers the strongest
doctrinal support for a right to notice, while arguments based on
consideration rely on more creative analysis. At the same time, treating
reasonable notice as a gap filler yields only a default obligation to
provide notice of termination that parties (and certainly employers) are
capable of avoiding through written agreements that restore a “no
notice” regime. In contrast, a consideration-based analysis treats notice
as a substantive element of the contract necessary for contract formation
and enforcement.
A. Reasonable Notice as a Contract Gap Filler
Once upon a time, the law of contracts required a requisite degree of
specificity for contract enforcement. Where parties failed to provide
sufficient detail, a court would conclude that there had been no meeting
of the minds and the claim for breach would fail.153 This is no longer the
dominant view. Contemporary courts typically supply missing terms in
an agreement where the requisite intent to be bound can be discerned.154
Indeed, mainstream contracts literature recognizes that most contracts
are to some degree “incomplete,” in that they often fail to expressly set
forth all of the parties’ obligations or anticipate possible
contingencies.155 Whether such “gaps” result from drafting failures or
failures of the imagination,156 courts will attempt to fill them, either by
determining the parties’ intent with respect to the particular issue or by
153. See generally 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.3, at 569 (rev. ed.
1993).
154. See id. § 4.3, at 569–70.
155. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–93 (1989).
156. See id. at 92, 94 (exploring the different ways in which, and reasons why, contracts
may be incomplete vis-à-vis a particular future contingency).
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applying an accepted default rule.157
Termination at will is itself a default rule, applied in situations where
parties fail to specify the duration of their relationship and possible
reasons for termination. In this respect, employment law and general
contract law are aligned.158 In the case of indefinite commercial
agreements and other long-term nonemployment contracts, however,
courts generally supply a reasonable notice term in the absence of any
express provision regarding the process for termination.159
The clearest authority for this principle is Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which codifies a series of default rules applicable to
commercial agreements. The touchstone for most of these defaults is
reasonableness: parties are obligated to pay a “reasonable” price,160
deliver goods within a “reasonable” time,161 and set reasonable
quantities in instances where the governing contract does not provide a
more specific rule.162 The default rules with respect to contract
termination are consistent with this approach. Section 2-309 provides
that commercial relationships of indefinite duration are terminable at the
will of either party.163 However, § 2-309(3) “requires that reasonable
notification be received by the [non-terminating] party.”164 In other
words, the UCC allows parties to terminate at any point in the
relationship for any reason, but requires the terminating party to
157. The problem of how courts select particular gap fillers and set background default
rules is the subject of a large body of literature. See generally 6 PETER LINZER, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 26.4[A], at 430–41 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2010) (summarizing key contract
theories). I will discuss some of these ideas briefly, infra Section IV.A.
158. See U.C.C. § 2-309(2) (2012) (“If the contract provides for successive performances
but is indefinite in duration, it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be
terminated at any time by either party.”).
159. See, e.g., id. § 2-309(3) (“Termination of a contract by one party except on the
happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other
party . . . .”).
160. See id. § 2-305(1) (“The parties if they so intend may conclude a contract for sale
even if the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for
delivery . . . .”).
161. See id. § 2-309(1) (“The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a
contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time.”).
162. See, e.g., id. § 2-306(1). The pertinent portion of the UCC provides:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may
occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to
any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or
otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or
demanded.
Id.
163. Id. § 2-309(2).
164. Id. § 2-309(3).
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mitigate the harm to the other side by giving advance warning of the
loss.
Case law in this area illustrates how a notice requirement
comfortably coexists with the principle of at-will termination. In Pharo
Distributing v. Stahl,165 the parties had worked together for several
years pursuant to an oral distributorship agreement when the defendant
advised the plaintiff that it had purchased its own distributorship and
that the contract would end six days later.166 The agreement did not
contemplate a fixed duration, and the court presumed that the defendant
had the right to terminate at any time.167 Notwithstanding, it permitted
the subdistributor to claim damages.168 While the loss occasioned by the
termination of the contract was not itself compensable, the court
explained, the losses owing to the failure to give sufficient advance
warning were.169 The failure to notify deprived the terminated party of
“an opportunity to make appropriate arrangement[s],” such as finding a
replacement supplier, unloading inventory, and making workforce
adjustments.170
Outside the UCC context, where common law applies, the default
rule regarding notice is less explicit. However, the dominant approach,
to the extent it can be disentangled from the employment law cases,171
appears consistent with the UCC requirement of reasonable advance
warning of termination.172 Thus, courts have frequently implied a
common law reasonable notice term to non-UCC distributorship
contracts.173 In California Wine Ass’n v. Wisconsin Liquor, for instance,
165. 782 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
166. Id. at 636.
167. Id. at 638.
168. Id. at 639.
169. Id. at 638 (“It is not the termination of an at-will contract that constitutes the breach;
the right to terminate is inherent in the nature of the contract. . . . Rather, it is the failure to give
reasonable notice before termination that constitutes breach.”).
170. Id. at 638.
171. The misunderstanding of employment at will has muddied the waters of general
contract law in this context. Occasionally, courts have felt compelled to find indefinite,
nonemployment contracts terminable at will without notice based on analogy to employment at
will. See, e.g., Cronk v. Vogt’s Ice Cream, Inc., 15 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936);
infra Section IV.A. Other courts have made a point to distinguish contrary employment cases in
implying a reasonable notice requirement in nonemployment cases. See, e.g., J. C. Millett Co. v.
Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (finding cases involving
indefinite employment contracts “not controlling” in a pre-UCC distributorship contract
termination dispute because the latter involved both professional services and sales of goods).
172. See Teitelbaum v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 520 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (1988) (noting that
UCC § 2-309 “codif[ies] common law principles that existed before the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code”).
173. See, e.g., Cal. Wine Ass’n v. Wis. Liquor Co. of Oshkosh, 121 N.W.2d 308, 315–17
(Wis. 1963) (attaching a reasonable notice requirement to an implied contract for exclusive
liquor distributorship); Aronowicz v. Nalley’s Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35, 51 (Cal. Ct. App.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2

1548

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a wine and brandy producer
breached its exclusive distributorship contract by appointing a dual
distributor without advance notice to the original distributor.174 The
court held that in the face of contractual silence, “either party may
terminate [the contract] at pleasure by giving reasonable notice . . . of
his intention,” and upheld the trial court’s conclusion that sixty days’
notice would have been reasonable under the circumstances. 175
The same can be said, albeit with somewhat less consistency, of
other types of indefinite agreements. Louisiana, owing to its civil law
history, offers an easy illustration. That state’s general code of civil
obligations, Article 2024, explicitly provides that a “contract of
unspecified duration” may be terminated at will by either party “by
giving notice, reasonable in time and form.”176 This rule has been
applied to personal and small business relationships, some of which
resemble employment relationships. In Caston v. Woman’s Hospital
Foundation,177 for instance, the plaintiff was a photographer who
received permission from the chairman of the defendant–hospital’s
board of directors to photograph all infants born in the hospital in
exchange for thirty percent of his sales proceeds.178 Within days of
setting up in the ward and beginning to photograph, the head of the
pediatric department asked him to remove his equipment and the
hospital terminated the arrangement shortly after.179 In the
photographer’s subsequent suit for breach, the Louisiana Court of
Appeals, relying on a case involving a radio advertising contract, held
that the plaintiff’s contract with the hospital was “one terminable upon
the giving of reasonable notice.”180 The court went on to conclude,
without any factual explanation, that “six months[’] notice would have
been reasonable” and awarded the photographer the amount he would
have made during a six-month period.181

1972) (applying a reasonable notice requirement to an oral meat distributorship contract); cf.
Boland Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
(finding a material question of fact whether a pet shop supply distributor had expended
significant sums or substantially arranged its business such that the manufacturer could not
terminate its nonexclusive contract without reasonable notice).
174. 121 N.W.2d 308, 317 (Wis. 1963)
175. Id. at 316. The court affirmed the trial court’s award to the distributor of its
prospective margin on sales for the sixty-day period following breach of the exclusive
arrangement. Id. at 318.
176. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (2013).
177. 262 So. 2d 62 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
178. Id. at 63.
179. Id. at 64.
180. Id. at 65 (quoting Daily States Pub. Co v. Uhalt, 126 So. 228, 232 (1930)).
181. Id.
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B. Reasonable Notice as a Good Faith Duty
The preceding analysis offers one possible foundation for a default
rule requiring reasonable notice of employment termination consistent
with mainstream contract law. However, that is as far as it goes. By
definition, default rules (and contract gap fillers more generally) apply
only in the event that parties fail to directly address a particular issue in
their contract. Were a comparable rule adopted in the employment
context, employers could reinstitute the current “no notice” system by
insisting that their employees sign written agreements to that effect.182
Under the UCC, however, the ability to alter default terms must be
understood in relationship to broader contractual obligations of good
faith. As the comment to § 2-309 explains, the reasonable notice default
recognizes that “the application of principles of good faith and sound
commercial practice normally call for such notification . . . as will give
the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement.”183
Since parties have only limited ability to contract out of good faith, their
ability to avoid reasonable notice obligations is similarly constrained.
Indeed, § 2-309 states that an agreement limiting or dispensing with
notice is unenforceable “if its operation would be unconscionable.”184
This language could be interpreted to disallow immediate termination
based on extreme hardship to the losing party, notwithstanding a
contract provision purporting to grant that right.
For a reasonable notice rule to provide a modicum of protection to
workers, it is important to similarly moor the doctrinal arguments in
favor of such an approach to deeper components of contractual
obligation within the employment relationship. As in the UCC context,
the universally implied contractual duty of good faith can provide that
anchor. Good faith is an obligation inherent in every contract, including,
according to most courts, employment contracts.185 Its purpose is to
182. See generally Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 66–67 (discussing this
risk); Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for Employment
Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 174 (2006) (expressing skepticism about
a waivable notice right, observing that “[t]he reality . . . is that employees will agree to just
about anything an employer wants. Whether this is due to employee desperation, inequality of
bargaining power, signaling concerns, or lack of information, permitting employers and
employees to bargain around the mandatory notice requirement would likely make it
worthless”).
183. U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 8 (2012).
184. See id. § 2-309(3). Section 1-302(b) specifies that when the UCC provides for an
action “to be taken within a reasonable time,” parties may fix a particular timeframe that is not
“manifestly unreasonable.” Id. § 1-302(b).
185. See id. § 1-304; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 (2009) (“Each party to an employment contract, including
at-will employment, owes a non-waivable duty of good faith and fair dealing to each other
party.”). For an example of the application of the implied duty of good faith in the employment
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limit unbridled use of discretion. Its effect is to preclude behavior that
otherwise would be permitted under a strict reading of the parties’
express contract.
Two well-developed theoretical approaches to good faith have
framed the contemporary understanding of the scope of the duty within
the mainstream contracts literature: Professor Robert Summers’s
“excluder” approach186 and Professor Steven Burton’s “forgone benefit
approach.”187 The excluder approach embraces a broad notion of good
faith, incapable of specific definition, that prohibits a variety of
behaviors that may occur during performance—evasion and delay,
willful underperformance, obstructing performance, and similar
conduct.188 In contrast, the foregone benefit approach finds a breach of
the duty only where a party abuses contractually conferred discretion to
recapture opportunities sacrificed at contract formation.189 Under such
an approach, the implied duty applies principally to situations in which
a party attempts to withhold or obstruct the flow of benefits rightfully
allocated by the contract to his or her opponent.
As a matter of general contract doctrine, the broad excluder
approach has won the day. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
explicitly adopts an expansive view of good faith, one that
“emphasizes . . . consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party” and excludes conduct that “violate[s] community standards of
decency, fairness or reasonableness.”190 The UCC draws on this
approach in setting forth its previously described gap filler provisions,
which amount to specific elaborations on the doctrine. These principles
all impose an obligation to act “reasonably” and “in good faith” with
respect to matters on which the contract is vague or silent or permits
significant latitude to one party.191 Thus, for instance, a party must act
reasonably and in good faith in setting an open quantity term tied to its
context, see Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977). As will
be discussed, however, the contours of the duty are limited in the employment context. See infra
Section IV.B.
186. See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 207 (1968) [hereinafter
Summers, Good Faith]; Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818–21, 825–30 (1982) [hereinafter Summers,
General Duty].
187. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372–73 (1980).
188. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 186, at 204.
189. See Burton, supra note 187, at 387–88. For an excellent summary of these two
theories, see Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach
to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1033–49 (2003).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
191. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (2012) (“A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer
means a price to be fixed in good faith.”).
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output, production requirements, or other fluctuating benchmarks.192 In
this way the doctrine ensures that parties abide by an implicit code of
business ethics during the life of their agreement.
While good faith serves largely to moderate party performance and
preserve contractual relationships, § 2-309 makes clear that it also
resonates at the point of termination, particularly in the context of longterm contracts.193 As the court in Pharo puts it, it is an obligation that is
grounded in “fairness and equity” and designed to grant the losing party
time to “‘get[] his house in order’ to proceed in absence of the former
relationship.”194
C. Reasonable Notice as Consideration
The duty of good faith offers a well-grounded doctrinal basis for
implying a reasonable notice obligation, and one that is more robust
than a mere default rule. Understanding reasonable notice as an aspect
of good faith ties that obligation to a larger and broader implied duty
that may not be fully waived. That said, contract law is unclear as to the
degree to which a party can contract around good faith by expressly
permitting that which the duty would otherwise preclude.195 Under the
UCC, unconscionability serves as an overall limit on contracting
practices and is specifically mentioned with respect to waivers of notice
of termination.196 For this reason, this Article contends, infra, that the
unconscionability doctrine should be understood to void such waivers,
at least in the employment context. At this juncture it is fair to note,
however, that unconscionability, particularly in the case of sophisticated
commercial transactions, is an extremely high standard. A true
mandatory obligation—one that may not be waived by the parties—
192. See id. § 2-306(1).
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may
occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to
any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or
otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or
demanded.
Id.
193. See id. § 2-309 cmt. 8. The same relationship has been recognized by courts applying
the common law. See, e.g., Misco, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 203 (6th Cir. 1986)
(“Reasonable notice of termination flows from and must be determined in accordance with the
standards of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.”).
194. Pharo Distrib. Co. v. Stahl, 782 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
195. See, e.g., Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 41 Cal. App. 4th 798, 804 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (reviewing competing decisions on the relationship between the duty of good faith and
express reservations of contractual discretion).
196. See U.C.C. § 2-309(3).
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must therefore rely on a different doctrinal theory.
The doctrine of consideration can do this work. A clear backstop to
the enforceability of clauses that implicate the duty of good faith is the
point at which the contract would be so discretionary as to make it
illusory on one or both sides.197 While the notion of mutuality of
obligation has long been discredited, at a minimum both parties must
have made a promise or engaged in a solicited performance in order for
a contract to exist.198 Where parties do not have this modicum of
consideration, their promises are said to be illusory.199
The effect of labeling a contract illusory is to declare it nonbinding,
and indeed one judicial approach to illusory contracts is to refuse
enforcement. However, courts have at times inferred or implied an
obligation on the part of one or both parties to make the contract
enforceable if there is an intent to be bound. The classic example is
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,200 in which Lady Duff-Gordon, a
fashion designer, awarded Wood an exclusive license to market her
creations.201 Wood, however, made no promises in the contract other
than to pay Lady Duff-Gordon half the profits if her creations sold.202
Rather than declare the contract unenforceable, then-Judge Cardozo,
writing on behalf of the New York Court of Appeals, implied an
obligation on Wood’s part to use “reasonable efforts to bring profits and
revenues into existence.”203
While implying reasonable (or good faith) efforts is perhaps the
dominant judicial response to such omissions, implying a reasonable
notice obligation is another way to save a contract that would otherwise
be lacking consideration. Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States,204 a case involving government purchase of trap rock, illustrates
this approach.205 The plaintiff was a quarry who won four bids to supply
the defendant’s requirements of different sizes of rock for an airport
construction project.206 The contracts were government-drafted forms
containing no delivery terms, which included the following language:
197. See Third Story Music, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 808 (“[C]ourts are not at liberty to imply a
covenant directly at odds with a contract’s express grant of discretionary power except in those
relatively rare instances when reading the provision literally would, contrary to the parties’ clear
intention, result in an unenforceable, illusory agreement.”).
198. See 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 6.1, at 204 (rev. ed. 1995).
199. See id. at 207.
200. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
201. Id. at 214.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 215.
204. 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945).
205. Id. at 644.
206. Id. at 642–43.
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“Cancellation by the Procurement Division may be effected at any
time.”207 The facts giving rise to the parties’ dispute are not reported,
but the defendant allegedly refused to “request or accept delivery” and
the issue, as framed by the court was “whether [the defendant had]
made any promise that has been broken” in light of the broad
cancellation clause in the contracts.208
The Second Circuit found that it had. The court concluded that,
despite what the contracts said, the cancellation clause could not be read
to grant the government the power to terminate at any time without
warning.209 Such an interpretation would have been unreasonable, as it
would have allowed the government to request a delivery and then
refuse to accept it.210 Moreover, by giving one party absolute discretion
as to whether to perform, such a reading would have “ma[d]e nugatory
the entire contract.”211 Rather, the court held that the clause should be
understood to require the government to accept and pay for the rock
unless and until it provided “notice of cancellation [to the plaintiff]
within a reasonable time.”212 The court explained:
[I]f it be assumed that the United States was acting in good
faith in accepting the plaintiff’s bid[, t]he words should be
so construed as to support the contract and not render
illusory the promises of both parties. . . . [T]he agreement
obligated the defendant to give delivery instructions or
notice of cancellation within a reasonable time after the
date of its “acceptance.” This constituted consideration for
the plaintiff’s promise to deliver in accordance with
delivery instructions, and made the agreement a valid
contract.213
Such a reading, the court recognized, still gave the government a
significant advantage in the contracting relationship, allowing it to
preserve its option not to perform at all subject only to the notice
requirement.214 That said, this obligation was “a sufficient consideration
to support the contract.”215
Sylvan stands for the proposition that a pure at-will contract—one
207. Id. at 643.
208. Id. at 642–44.
209. Id. at 644–45.
210. Id. at 644 (“[The government’s] ‘acceptance’ [of the plaintiff’s bids] should be
interpreted as a reasonable business man would have understood it. Surely it would not have
been understood thus: ‘We accept your offer and bind you to your promise to deliver, but we do
not promise either to take the rock or pay the price.’”).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 645.
215. Id.
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that is at will in both the substantive and procedural sense—is not a
contract at all, although the parties may so intend. In such cases,
implying an obligation to provide advance notice of termination is one
way to preserve the contract while respecting the clear intent of the
drafting party to retain broad discretion to terminate for any or no
reason.
IV. CLAIMING CONTRACT LAW FOR EMPLOYMENT LAW
The previous Part demonstrated that contract law, using a variety of
theories, ordinarily imputes an obligation to provide reasonable notice
of termination in the case of indefinite contracts otherwise terminable at
will. The question then is whether and why employment law might
deviate from these rules of general applicability. If anything, there
appears to be even stronger arguments in favor of advance notice of
termination in the employment context, particularly where the employer
initiates the termination. Unlike business entities, most workers are
unable to diversify their investments across multiple contracts and
generally lack the liquidity necessary to withstand the loss of such an
important relationship. Advance warning is therefore necessary as a
policy matter to give the worker time to find replacement employment
and avoid a sudden disruption in income.216
This Part examines the use of the previously described contract
doctrines and theories—the use of reasonable gap fillers, the implied
duty of good faith, and the doctrine of consideration—in the
employment context. In contrast to how these concepts are deployed in
other contractual settings, courts examining employment relationships
generally do not imply or impose reasonable notice obligations on the
parties. In fact, they often do not consider these contractual principles as
part of the governing law. Rather, courts analyze employment
relationships exclusively through the lens of employment at will, often
treating the relationship as somehow less than contractual owing to the
parties’ freedom to terminate. This Part critiques this deviant treatment
of employment contracts, arguing that courts should follow the same
notice rules applied to other contracting parties and demonstrating how
this can be accomplished consistent with employment at will.
A. Reasonable Notice as the “Other” Employment Law Default
In interpreting employment contracts, courts do not use the
terminology of gap filling, but that is in fact what they do. The power to
terminate at will is a default term that courts apply in the face of party
216. I have explored such considerations extensively in other works. See, e.g., ArnowRichman, Just Notice, supra note 8 passim; Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra note 8
passim.
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silence as to contract duration, just as they do in the case of other
indefinite agreements. But while courts interpreting nonemployment
contracts will also supply a reasonable notice term, courts treat
employment at will as both a comprehensive and exclusive
presumption. Courts seem unable to conceive of an employment
relationship being terminable at any time for any reason, while
simultaneously being subject to an advance notice requirement. The
latter obligation is deemed antithetical to employment at will, and
employment at will is itself seen as antithetical to contract.
This disconnect is clearest in the case law of Louisiana where, as
previously noted, a general rule requiring reasonable notice to terminate
an indefinite contract has been codified.217 Some courts have asserted
that this provision applies equally to employment relationships.218
Others have declined to apply the rule to employment at will, though
they are at pains to explain why. The analysis in Finkle v. Majik
Market,219 a case involving the termination of a store manager, is
telling.220 The plaintiff alleged breach of promises of training and
promotion and the failure to provide notice of termination.221 Regarding
the latter claim, the court quoted the reasonable notice provision of
Article 2024 and acknowledged its applicability to “any type of
contract,” including employment.222 It went on however to qualify this
statement, adding that “[w]here there is no specific contract between
[the parties], the employee is at-will and may be terminated . . . without
the notice requirement.”223 The court did not explain what it meant by a
“specific” contract, but concluded that the plaintiff did not have one:
In this case, defendant has provided ample evidence to
show that the relationship between it and plaintiff was
simple, at-will employment. The affidavits of the company
personnel state that plaintiff was not hired under a contract
for an indefinite or definite term. Further, the employment
application, signed by plaintiff, specifically states that he is
217. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (2013).
218. See, e.g., Carlson v. Superior Supply Co., 536 So. 2d 444, 446 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(asserting in employment termination case that “[a] contract for an indefinite period is
terminable at the will of either party upon giving reasonable notice”); 6 EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 22:4 (West, updated Apr. 2014) (“Under the Louisiana Civil
Code[] . . . oral contracts for employment of indefinite duration are terminable at any time at the
will of either party upon reasonable notice.”), available at Westlaw EDC ANAREL § 22:4.
219. 628 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
220. See id. at 261–62.
221. Id. at 261.
222. See id. at 261–62.
223. Id. at 262; see also LOUISIANA PRACTICE: EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12:7 (2013–2014)
(“Although Civil Code art. 2024 requires notice ‘reasonable in time and form’ prior to
termination, at-will employment contracts generally require no notice of termination.”).
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not being offered a position with a contract of
employment.224
The reasoning here is opaque, but it appears that the court
misapprehends the basic notion of contract, conflating the presence of
express terms with the existence of an enforceable agreement. The court
seems to think that absent an explicit statement as to duration (whether
specific or indefinite) there is no contract between the parties. If that
were true, there would be no need for Article 2024. “[S]imple, at-will
employment” is a contract for an indefinite term—an agreement to
exchange labor for remuneration albeit for an unspecified time.225 Thus,
while the court claims to base its conclusion on a technical application
of contract law, there appears to be no doctrinal reason for the
distinction in treatment.
Admittedly, the common law rule with respect to notice of
termination is not uncontested. Some courts have rejected the idea even
outside the employment context.226 However, that may owe more to the
pervasiveness of the strict interpretation of employment at will than to
any uncertainty as to how “mainstream” contract principles would
otherwise play out. A pre-UCC case for the sale of milk in New York is
illustrative. In Cronk v. Vogt’s Ice Cream, an ice cream company agreed
to buy its requirements of milk and cream from the defendant supplier

224. Finkle, 628 So. 2d at 262.
225. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what kind of employment contract would be subject to
Article 2024 if not the one in Finkle. Had the parties agreed to a fixed term, they would not have
had a “contract of unspecified duration.” It is possible that the court had in mind a written
agreement containing a provision that the duration of employment was “indefinite,” but
distinctions based on the form of the agreement (oral versus written, implied versus express) are
anathema to contracts. Moreover, it is likely that the plaintiff signed a statement to the same
effect. According to the court, the plaintiff’s job application stated that he was not “being
offered a position with a contract of employment.” Id. Such language frequently accompanies
boilerplate acknowledgements of “at-will” status that employees are asked to sign upon
applying for or commencing employment. I have described this trend in several earlier articles.
See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term,
Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2007) [hereinafter ArnowRichman, Rise of Delayed Term] (discussing this practice); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap
Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard
Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963 [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap
Contracts and Worker Mobility] (same).
226. See, e.g., City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 156 S.E.2d 818, 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)
(concluding in credit card cancellation dispute that “[a]s a rule there is no requirement of prior
notice for termination by the issuer”); Cronk v. Vogt’s Ice Cream, Inc., 15 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936) (concluding that buyer was not obligated to provide advance notice of
termination of indefinite requirements contract); Simon Bros. Co., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
83 Wis. 2d 701, 710 (1978) (concluding that supplier–brewer was not liable to distributor for
termination of an indefinite contract without notice).
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for an unspecified period of time.227 The relationship continued for
approximately nineteen months, at which point the defendant stopped
buying from the plaintiff.228 The court found no breach in the
defendant–buyer’s cessation of performance, noting the general rule
applicable to “agency and employment” contracts that, absent a specific
duration, a contract is ordinarily terminable at will.229 It went on to
conclude that, similarly, there was no obligation on the part of the
defendant–buyer to provide any advance notice of its decision to
terminate, again drawing on employment law:
No notice is required in this state to terminate employment
contracts at will, and the logic for the distinction claimed
[between employment contracts and non-employment
contracts] is not apparent. Significantly enough, other
jurisdictions in which notice is said to be necessary, treat
all agreements of a continuing nature alike in that
respect.230
The court did not cite any case law directly supporting the proposition
that employment termination can be effected without notice, and it
dismissed as “loose statements” language in several older New York
decisions to the contrary.231 Oddly, in support of its assertion that a
universal rule should govern all contracts, it cited cases from other
jurisdictions applying a reasonable notice rule.232 Thus, the court
appears to have followed its reasoning to precisely the wrong
conclusion. Rather than arrest an unjustified divergence between
employment and contract law, it elevated an arguably aberrational
reading of the law of termination in the employment context to the level
of a universal principle of contracts.233
227. 15 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 654.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 654–55 (citing Hess v. Iowa Light, Heat & Power Co., 221 N.W. 194, 196–
97 (Iowa 1928), Bastian v. Marienville Glass Co., 126 A. 798, 799 (Pa. 1924), and City of
Milwaukee v. City of West Allis, 258 N.W. 851, 852 (Wis. 1935)).
233. Another context in which courts have rejected a reasonable notice rule is consumer
contracts with credit card companies. See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Exp. Co., 743 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir.
1984); City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 156 S.E.2d 818, 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967). This distinction
may be explained by the fact that courts treat such contracts as unilateral. See, e.g., City Stores
Co., 156 S.E.2d at 824. Employment has historically been viewed as a unilateral contract as
well, but as I will discuss, infra, this is a mischaracterization. See infra Section IV.C.
Regardless, the more contemporary credit card cases (such as those involving a unilateral
change in terms by the credit card company, such as the adoption of an arbitration policy),
generally involve notice to the cardholder, a practice presumably adopted by issuers as a risk
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The one thing Cronk did correctly was identify the operative
question—whether there is a reason to treat employment differently
from other indefinite relationships. As the court suggests, contract law
has long proceeded under the assumption that a universal set of rules
and principles applies to all voluntary agreements.234 To the extent
courts (and contract theorists) have deviated from this assumption, they
have been motivated at least in part by a desire to achieve more just
results, suitable to particular contexts.235 Yet such considerations would
suggest that employees are more, not less, in need of a reasonable notice
default than other contracting parties. Business entities are well
positioned to negotiate express contractual provisions protecting
themselves in anticipation of termination. They are also more likely to
know and take account of background rules in the process.236
In this way, a reasonable notice rule is consistent with a variety of
theories as to how courts should create and apply contract default rules.
One of the most prominent accounts proposes the adoption of “penalty
defaults” that force the party with superior information to reveal its
contractual preference to the less informed.237 A reasonable notice
management strategy. E.g., Providian Nat’l Bank v. Screws, 894 So. 2d 625, 627–28 (Ala.
2003).
234. Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915,
916 (2012) (describing the predominance during the last thirty years of “unification theories” of
contracts which “present[] a single justificatory principle as the core around which the entire law
of contract should be understood”).
235. Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 82–85
(2009) (articulating three critiques of the notion of a “General Contract Law,” including the
claim that it yields unjust results in cases that deviate from an “idealized vision of contracting
parties”).
236. Workers’ limited understanding of the employment at-will default has been both
documented empirically and much discussed by workplace law scholars. See, e.g., Guy
Davidov, In Defence of (Efficiently Administered) ‘Just Cause’ Dismissal Laws, 23 INT’L J.
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 117, 122 (2007) (pointing out that “employees tend to believe that
the law provides more job security for them than it actually does”); Cynthia L. Estlund, How
Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9–10
(2002) (citing studies showing that “most employees believe that they enjoy something like ‘just
cause’ protection even in the absence of any express contractual protection”); Pauline T. Kim,
Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in
an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (demonstrating through survey data that
workers believe “that they have far greater rights against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they
in fact have under an at-will contract”); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring
the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 479–80 (hypothesizing
that employees overestimate their rights because they “confuse law and norms” and thereby
wrongly think “that the law prohibits what fairness forbids,” particularly with regard to
discharge); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 119–20
(2002) (contending that workers “have a false and exaggerated understanding of their legal
rights”).
237. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
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default would have this effect, prodding the employer to express its
preference for a “no notice” term in writing and preventing the
employer from reaping the benefit of a favorable background rule
without paying for it.238 The rule is also consistent with more relational
accounts of default rules such as those that apply basic notions of
fairness or seek to account for the norms of the relationship.239 Finally,
a reasonable notice rule can be justified as a “conventionalist default
rule,” one that reflects the common assumptions of laypeople, which
would presumably include the adage that termination of employment
requires the proverbial two weeks’ notice.240
A full account of the theory of default rules is beyond the scope of
this Article.241 The point, however, is that mainstream contract law
generally presumes a reasonable notice default, and there is no
theoretical obstacle to extending that rule to employment relationships.
To the contrary, the practical and theoretical justifications for a
reasonable notice rule are greater in the context of employment than in
commercial relationships. It makes little sense to grant a business entity
on the losing side of a failed contract a period of continued profits while
denying an individual worker any advance warning or recourse against
his or her employer.
B. Procedural Good Faith Consistent with Employment At Will
Employment law has similarly veered from the basic contract
understanding of the duty of good faith. Although both the UCC and the
common law treat the duty of good faith as an inherent feature of every
contract, some courts have refused to recognize it in the employment
context.242 Those that have recognized the duty have adopted the narrow
“foregone benefit” definition of the duty rather that the more widely
accepted “excluder” definition.243 The only factual context in which
good faith claims by employees have enjoyed a modicum of success has
been where the plaintiff’s termination results in the deprivation of a

238. A similar argument has been made with in support of replacing employment at will
with a just cause default. See Sunstein, supra note 236, at 121.
239. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 43, 54–56 (1993); Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structure, Legal Structure, and
Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 19, 27–28 (1993).
240. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent,
3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 421, 432 (1993).
241. For an excellent summary of some of the seminal papers in this area, see 6 PETER
LINZER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 26.4[A] (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2010).
242. See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983) (finding
the implication of a duty of good faith “incongruous” with the employer’s “unfettered right to
terminate the [plaintiff’s] employment at any time”).
243. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
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promised benefit.244 Thus, courts have recognized a limited cause of
action for deferred payments, such as commissions or bonuses, or the
value of a vested benefit where the termination was motivated by a
desire to avoid payment.245
Even in those cases that fit this factual paradigm, courts have not
permitted recovery absent a demonstration of actual bad faith in the
form of an intent to deprive the worker of the lost benefit, a standard not
applicable in commercial law relationships.246 In addition, courts have
refused even in successful cases to award damages for lost employment
generally, as in lost wages.247
This rigid treatment of the duty of good faith reflects a vaulted and
doctrinally problematic understanding of employment at will. The
conclusion that at-will employment somehow trumps other implied
duties relies on the misapplication of a rule of interpretation that
pertains to express contract language. Contract law permits parties to
limit the scope of the good faith duty by expressly granting or reserving
areas of contractual discretion in their agreement.248 But most
employees do not have written contracts. Where there is no written
agreement between the parties, employment at will is an implied term
just like good faith—a provision supplied by law.249 Courts rejecting
employee good faith based on the “conflict” between the implied duty
and employment at will err in elevating what is merely a default
principle to the status of an explicit reservation of discretion.
More importantly, the inherent inconsistency between the implied
duty of good faith and such a written reservation of discretion arises
only when good faith is equated with a substantive limitation on the
power to terminate. Employment plaintiffs bringing implied duty claims
tend to frame their cases around allegations that their employer had a
244. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977).
245. See id. at 1253.
246. See id. at 1255–56 (holding that a cause of action for breach of duty of good faith is
available where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the termination was for the purpose of
depriving him of earned commissions).
247. For this reason, some scholars have eschewed the doctrine altogether in favor of
relying on other common law theories in seeking to expand workers’ termination rights. See,
e.g., Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 MO. L. REV. 1233, 1233–34 (1992).
248. See VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773, 778 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (“The general rule [regarding the implied duty of good faith] is plainly subject to the
exception that the parties may, by express provisions of the contract, grant the right to engage in
the very acts and conduct which would otherwise have been forbidden by an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. . . . [I]f defendants were given the right to do what they did by the
express provisions of the contract there can be no breach.”); supra Section III.B.
249. In fact, good faith is the more robust of the two implied terms—a mandatory and
universally implied term that, per U.C.C. § 1-302 (2012), may not be waived, rather than an
ordinary default term that parties are free to replace.
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bad faith reason for terminating them—what may be described as a
“substantive good faith” claim.250 This type of claim falls in neatly with
the broader common law wrongful discharge jurisprudence, which has
recognized various paths to overcoming the at-will presumption in
situations involving wrongful or arbitrary employer motivation.251 Yet
such inquiries into why the employer acted are in direct tension with the
most entrenched component of employment at-will—the substantive
discretion rule. For this reason, it may be more fitting—and more useful
to employee litigants—to think of the duty of good faith as a procedural
obligation, one that requires parties to act fairly in carrying out
discretionary decisions that are otherwise immune from substantive
review.
Although no court has taken this “procedural good faith” approach to
notice of employment termination, there are a handful of cases
involving other types of employment disputes that suggest judicial
amenability to such a development. One example derives from the
unlikely context of employee drug testing. In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska
Drilling, Inc.,252 the Alaska Supreme Court held that as a matter of good
faith, an employer had to provide advance notice to its workers of its
decision to institute a drug testing protocol.253 There, the worker was
suspended for testing positive for drugs and terminated when he failed
to appear for a retest.254 The court found nothing against public policy
in the termination, concluding that the employer’s interest in safety
outweighed the employee’s interest in privacy.255 It held, however, that
the initial suspension violated the duty of good faith because the
employer had failed to provide the worker advance notice of its drug
testing policy.256 The duty of good faith, the court explained, not only
has substantive content but also requires that the employer act in “a
manner which a reasonable person would regard as fair.”257
The recognition of promissory estoppel claims by neophyte
250. See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983)
(plaintiff accountant asserted that his employer had wrongfully terminated him for flagging
accounting improprieties in accordance with his job duties).
251. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1655, 1657–62 (1996) (describing the development of “bad motive” exceptions to
employment at will through antiretaliation statutes and public policy jurisprudence); Ann C.
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Will: Toward a Coherent National
Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1491–93 (1996) (same).
252. 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992) [Luedtke II].
253. Id. at 1225–26.
254. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. [Luedtke I], 768 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Alaska
1989).
255. Id. at 1133–37.
256. Luedtke II, 834 P.2d at 1225–26.
257. Id. at 1224.
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employees offers another example. Courts have held that employees
terminated immediately upon or prior to starting a new job have a
limited cause of action where they made investments or incurred losses
based on the employer’s offer. In the seminal case, Grouse v. Group
Health Plan, Inc.,258 a pharmacist resigned from his current
employment and turned down a job in reliance on the defendant’s offer
of employment, only to be fired prior to starting his new position.259
The court recognized a claim under the Restatement of Contracts § 90,
treating the plaintiff’s foregone job opportunities as a form of
detrimental reliance.260 Its rationale, however, was informed by good
faith notions. Attempting to delineate the scope of the cause of action,
the court distinguished the plaintiff’s situation from that of ordinary atwill employees, noting that under the facts presented the employee “had
a right to assume he would be given a good faith opportunity to
perform . . . once he was on the job.”261 The result is equivalent to a
minimum period of employment, much like what would be required
under a reasonable notice rule.262
Of course, analogies to drug testing and promissory estoppel cases
are attenuated, but they lend some support to a theory that has much to
commend itself as a policy matter. Indeed, it would be surprising for a
court to dismiss entirely the possibility of a procedural good faith claim
given the underlying rational for reasonable notice under the UCC and
nonemployment contract law. Almost invariably the employee will have
made a significant financial and personal investment in the job and will
need time to wind up the relationship and find an alternative “buyer” for
his or her services.
258. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
259. Id. at 115–16.
260. See id.
261. Id. at 116. In many ways the implied duty of good faith provides a better rationale for
these cases than promissory estoppel, which poses a more direct conflict with substantive
employment at will. While disappointed employees can generally show reliance in retracted
offer cases, they are often at pains to meet the other elements of the promissory estoppel claim.
Courts struggle to explain how it is reasonable for an employee to rely on a promise of at-will
employment or why it is unjust for the employee to suffer the consequence of such reliance. See,
e.g., May v. Harris Mgmt. Corp., 928 So. 2d 140, 147 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (noting, in rejecting
Grouse, that it is “patently unreasonable” for an employee to rely on an offer of at-will
employment). In such cases, promissory estoppel is not substituting for the absence of an
enforceable contract or even for a failed contract, but is arguably enlisted to replace the contract
to which the parties ostensibly agreed.
262. A case involving a retracted offer arising under Florida’s reasonable notice rule
reveals the overlap between the two claims. In Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., the plaintiff
was a resident of England who relocated to Florida for a job with the defendant. 490 So. 2d 993
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Upon arriving in Florida, however, he learned that he would not be
employed. The court found actionable the defendant’s failure to provide reasonable notice of its
retraction and awarded the plaintiff damages for the expenses incurred in relocating to the
United States in reliance on the offer. Id. at 996.
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In fact, the current state of the duty of good faith in employment
relationships is puzzling. One would expect the law of good faith to
resonate most strongly in those contexts, such as employment, that
involve relationships of dependence and the risks associated with
nondiversifiable investments. Instead, commercial parties in arms’
length transactions appear to have greater good faith obligations to one
another than companies do in dealing with workers. Recognizing a
procedural good faith claim entitling employees to reasonable notice of
termination would be a convenient and doctrinally honest vehicle for
mitigating the harsh effects of employment at will without defeating the
substantive discretion aspect of the rule.
C. Reasonable Notice and the Bilateral Employment Contract
Finally, courts are highly idiosyncratic in their application of
contract formation principles to employment relationships. Whereas
contract law generally favors finding a mutually enforceable
relationship, courts invariably treat employment as a unilateral contract,
one in which the parties have no reciprocal obligations to each other.263
This peculiar treatment of employment contracts conflates the ability
to terminate at will with the absence of a binding obligation. Up until
the mid-twentieth century, courts frequently cited lack of mutuality as a
reason to refuse the enforcement of employer promises of long-term
employment in situations where the employee was not similarly
bound.264 Such thinking mistook mutuality of obligation for an
equivalency requirement and violated the bedrock principle that courts
do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.265
The majority of courts now recognize the error in that rationale, and
mutuality no longer figures prominently in employment contract
analysis. However, courts have not provided a more cogent theory of
consideration that explains how and to what extent parties to an
employment relationship are contractually obligated to one another
263. PERILLO & BENDER, supra note 198, § 6.2, at 213; Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral
Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 551–52 (1983).
264. Even courts disclaiming the applicability of mutuality of obligation often proceeded to
refuse enforcement based on a lack of equivalence in the parties’ ability to enforce the
agreement. Thus, some courts have insisted that the employee show “additional consideration”
to support an employer’s promise of job security beyond simple agreement to accept the job or
turn down another offer. See, e.g., Hanson v. Cent. Show Printing Co., 130 N.W.2d 654, 658
(Iowa 1964) (asserting that “the real basis for the majority rule” requiring additional
consideration is that “there is in fact no binding contract . . . when the employee has not agreed
to it; that is, when he is free to abandon it at any time”).
265. See PERILLO & BENDER, supra note 198, § 6.1; JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.10 (5th ed. 2003); id. § 4.12, at 205 (“The doctrine is not one of
mutuality of obligation but rather one of mutuality of consideration. . . . The concept of
‘mutuality of obligation’ has been thoroughly discredited.”).
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given that one or both remain free to terminate at will.266 Treating
employment as a unilateral contract sidesteps the issue. Under this
construction, a job offer (or any terms of employment) is viewed as an
offer for a unilateral contract that the employee may accept by
performance.267 If he or she accepts, the employer is obligated to pay
for the work performed, but neither has an obligation to continue. By
definition, only one side (the employer) has made any promise at all,
and that promise is a conditional one, contingent on the employee’s
choice to perform.
But unilateral contract analysis is an awkward vehicle for theorizing
the employment relationship.268 To begin, unilateral contract analysis
has an idiosyncratic and increasingly limited role within general
contract theory. The Second Restatement of Contracts famously rejected
the terminology of “unilateral/bilateral” and moved away from
distinctions that link contract formation to the manner of acceptance—
either promise or performance.269 According to the Restatement,
offerees are free to accept in any reasonable manner, unless the offeror
or the circumstances clearly specify.270 This relegates unilateral contract
analysis to a narrow universe of transactions in which the promisor does
not want to be bound until the performance is fully completed and the
266. See Lord, supra note 22, at 714 (recognizing that “[b]ecause the traditional rule allows
either party to an at-will relationship to put an end to it at any time, a promise by either the
employer or the employee to continue an existing at-will relationship is by its nature illusory”
and faulting courts for failing to treat promises premised on continued employment
accordingly).
267. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 81 (Cal. 2000) (describing a company’s
management security policy as an “implied in-fact unilateral contract,” the modification of
which was accepted by employees via their continued employment); Torosyan v. Boehringer
Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 96 (Conn. 1995) (“To determine the contents of any
particular implied contract of employment, the factual circumstances of the parties’ relationship
must be examined in light of legal rules governing unilateral contracts.”); Pine River State Bank
v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983) (describing employer’s personnel manual as a
“unilateral offer” that the employee accepted through “continued performance of his duties
despite his freedom to quit”); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J.
1985) (describing an employer’s personnel manual as “an offer that seeks the formation of a
unilateral contract—the employees’ bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding being
their continued work when they have no obligation to continue”); PERILLO & BENDER, supra
note 198, § 6.2; Bryce Yoder, How Reasonable is “Reasonable”? The Search for a Satisfactory
Approach to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1517, 1523 (2008).
268. Professors Hazel Beh and Jeffrey Stempel have argued against the characterization of
insurance contracts as unilateral for some of the same reasons. See Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance Policy: The Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract
Characterization, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 86, 89 (2010).
269. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 53–54 (1981).
270. See id. at § 50, cmt. a (“Offers commonly invite acceptance in any reasonable
manner . . . . In case of doubt, the offeree may choose to accept either by promising or by
rendering the requested performance.”).
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promisee is unable to promise complete performance. 271 These include
offers of rewards or other promises that might be fairly characterized as
a challenge or dare, such as paying someone to walk across the
Brooklyn Bridge.272
Employment does not fit this paradigm. As a practical matter,
employment is often offered with the expectation of a promissory
acceptance. The employer offers the job and the employee accepts with
the expectation that performance will begin at a subsequent time, which
may or may not be proximate to the time of acceptance. In the interim,
both parties are bound and wish to be bound so that the employee can
confidently suspend his or her job search and the employer conclude its
recruitment effort.
More importantly, such employment cannot be characterized as a
discrete transaction. No doubt some types of work lend themselves to
spot assignments—a contractor, for instance, may offer a laborer $100
to tear down a fence. In such cases it is possible to describe the
relationship as unilateral, though the better understanding is probably
that the laborer’s commencement of the work indicates a promise to
finish the job.273 The presumption of employment at will, however,
applies, by definition, to contracts of “indefinite” duration. The parties
commence performance with the idea that the work will be ongoing
unless and until one of them wishes to end the relationship for a
particular reason (whether good or bad), and with the understanding that
the performance itself will develop and change over time.274 Such
situations are antithetical to unilateral contract theory, which is
premised on the idea that the promisor’s obligation (usually simple
payment) will be triggered by the promissee’s total completion of a
discrete, identifiable action.275
Finally, characterizing employment as a unilateral contract does not
accord with party expectations and their explicit and implicit
271. See Pettit, supra note 263, at 560–65 (describing the typical application of unilateral
contract theory prior to its contemporary expansion into employment law).
272. This classic example is generally attributed to Professor I. Maurice Wormser’s article,
The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136 (1916). See Beh &
Stempel, supra note 268, at 93.
273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54, cmt. b. Certainly the builder is not
“indifferent” as to whether the fence is fully removed.
274. Cf. Beh & Stemple, supra note 268, at 112–13 (rejecting the idea that the insured’s
premium payment is a “complete performance” and suggesting that it is the first step in a longterm, relational contract involving continued payment for continued performance).
275. Modern contract law has itself retreated from the idea that the promissor is not bound
until performance is fully complete. Under § 45 of the Restatement, once performance has
begun, a promisor is prohibited from revoking his or her promise for a reasonable amount of
time sufficient to allow the promisee to complete performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 45 (1981). This doctrine, which is rarely invoked in the employment context,
further evidences the lack of fit between employment and unilateral contract theory.
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commitments. The hallmark of a unilateral contract is that only one side
is bound. Employment can be unilateral only if we accept the premise
that only the employer has made a promise (to pay for performance
rendered), and that the employee has committed to nothing. But this is
patently not the case. Employees make numerous explicit and implicit
promises when they accept a job—to show up to work (the first day and
thereafter), to be on time and ready to work, to perform diligently and
make reasonable efforts with respect to the work itself, to follow
supervisor instructions and employer policies, to refrain from
misconduct and other destructive behaviors, and in general to act in the
interest of the employer and in furtherance of its business. While many
such promises are implied rather than explicit, contemporary employers
frequently go further and solicit formal written promises from
workers—promises to refrain from postemployment competition,
promises to maintain confidentiality of employer information, promises
to abide by a dispute resolution policy—with every intention that they
are to contractually bind the worker in the future.276 That the employee
has the ability to terminate the relationship does not change the reality
that promises have been made on both sides.277
The idea that employment at will is a bilateral contract terminable
upon reasonable notice has not been explored in the termination
context.278 However, common law developments in the area of
handbook modification lend support to the analysis. Although the law in
this area remains unsettled, an emerging majority rule suggests that an
employer may alter its policies at will so long as it provides advance
notice of the change.279 While courts adopting this view persist in
276. I have discussed this trend in a number of earlier articles, as have others. See, e.g.,
Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 225, at 638–39; Arnow-Richman,
Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility, supra note 225, at 963–66; Cynthia L. Estlund,
Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a
Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 380–82 (2006).
277. See Beh & Stempel, supra note 268, at 113 (rejecting the idea that a policyholder’s
ability to cancel renders an insurance contract unilateral, noting that “the same might be said of
magazine subscriptions, record clubs, yard service, pool service, or countless other contractual
arrangements that are generally regarded as bilateral”).
278. A Florida case involving the enforcement of a covenant not to compete comes close.
In Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the court
described the parties’ fixed-term contract, which contained a clause permitting the employer to
terminate at will upon written notice, as “a bilateral contract containing mutual executory
promises.” The court found that the noncompete was not void for lack of mutuality, concluding
that the employer’s promise to provide written notice supplied the requisite consideration. Id.
279. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 81 (Cal. 2000); Bankey v. Storer Broad.
Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Mich. 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04(a)
(Preliminary Draft No. 8 2011). For a good summary of the state of the law on this issue, see W.
David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict with Public
Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2003).
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calling the parties’ contract unilateral, their approach better accords
with bilateral contract analysis.280 Modern contract law prohibits the
promisor in a unilateral agreement from withdrawing or altering the
terms of its offer once the promisee has begun performance.281
However, in a bilateral, at-will relationship, parties who are already free
to terminate on reasonable notice could similarly alter terms on
reasonable notice, the notice serving as notice of termination under the
old terms and the new terms serving as a new offer. In this way, the
bilateral contract analysis proposed here lends a much-needed doctrinal
underpinning for the emerging handbook modification rule.282
There is much more that can be said both about the limitations of
unilateral contract analysis in theorizing employment and about the
merits of bilateral contract analysis as the alternative. For purposes of
this Article, however, the point is merely that employment looks much
more like a long-term commercial relationship than daring someone to
climb a flagpole or offering a reward for the return of a lost cat. The
better understanding of the employment relationship is that it is a
bilateral contract much like a long-term commercial contract in which
both parties are committed—the buyer to buy and the seller to sell—
even if they are free to terminate at will. In both contexts, where the
parties retain absolute discretion to terminate at will, reasonable notice
supplies the requisite consideration for what might otherwise be
280. See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 77; Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 116.
281. Indeed, the very fact that employers often seek to modify their policies, and thus the
terms of the employment relationship, indicates that the relationship is bilateral rather than
unilateral. In a unilateral contract situation, the performance is acceptance that both binds and
completes the deal; there is no opportunity for a subsequent modification. As Professors Beh
and Stempel explain in their critique of unilateral contract theory in the insurance context:
[A]s a theoretical matter, unilateral amendment of the terms should have no
rule in unilateral contracts because, by definition, there has been no contract
formed or the contract is formed and fully executed at the same moment.
Logically, then, the mere presence of unilateral amendment of contract terms
suggests that the contract in question is not unilateral.
Beh and Stempel, supra note 268, at 119.
282. Interestingly, the Restatement of Employment supplies no doctrinal explanation for its
adoption of the majority rule on handbook modification. Rather it suggests that employers’ right
to modify handbooks unilaterally upon notice to the workforce is analogous to the type of notice
provided by administrative agencies in advance of changes in regulations. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b. This rationale, and the Restatement’s choice to
adopt a unilateral modification approach, has been subject to significant scholarly critique. See
Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of
Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 132
(2009) (noting that “no jurisdiction has adopted administrative agency estoppel as the
underlying rationale for enforcing employer policy statements” and questioning the analogy
between agency guidance and an employer promise which “directly establishes the substantive
rules governing that relationship”).
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considered an illusory undertaking.283
V. THE LIMITS OF COMMON LAW REASONABLE NOTICE
The previous Part argued that basic contract law principles of
general application suggest that every employment at-will contract
should be understood to include an implied reasonable notice term. It is
a separate question whether such an approach would in fact benefit
employees. If employers are able to easily contract around the rule, or if
the rule imposes significant reciprocal obligations, employees may be
no better off (and possibly worse off) than under a strong at-will rule.
Additionally, a reasonable notice rule is likely to pose administrative
challenges. Adopting a reasonableness standard could spur litigation
and introduce costs and uncertainty into the current wrongful discharge
system.
This Part does not aim to fully vet all of the possible economic and
administrative implications of a reasonable notice system.284 To the
extent that sophisticated parties to indefinite commercial contracts have
long operated under this rule, despite its limitations, the burden ought to
be on those who wish to except workers from the general scheme of
contract law to justify the differential treatment. This Part, however,
will touch on some of the key practical questions about how a common
law reasonable notice system might operate, focusing in particular on
the ways that employers might seek to avoid the administrative burdens
283. For an excellent discussion of the illusory nature of employment at will and the
difficulties posed by consideration analysis, see generally Lord, supra note 22, at 726–30, 746–
50, 764–66 (demonstrating how courts have mistakenly applied the doctrine of consideration in
enforcing promises not to compete by at-will employees). Professor Lord’s article focuses on
the particular context of covenants not to compete rather than at-will termination generally, and
he offers a different solution to the illusory contract problem than that which is proposed here.
Professor Lord advocates that courts either abandon the doctrine of consideration in favor of a
totality of the circumstances test or adopt the “Texas Position” under which noncompetes are
enforceable against at-will employees only if the employer provides actual consideration that is
not contingent on continued employment. Id. at 717, 766. Professor Lord’s work implicitly
recognizes, however, that an implied reasonable notice period would similarly supply the
requisite consideration for an enforceable agreement insofar as it effectively grants the
employee a period of guaranteed employment for whatever time period is reasonable. See id. at
750–53 (suggesting that a promise of at-will employment that is understood to include a good
faith opportunity for the employee to perform would constitute consideration for a noncompete
and that the immediate termination of the employee would be a failure of consideration possibly
amounting to a breach).
284. I have discussed several of these issues at greater length in previous work. See
generally Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra note 8, at 320–22 (exploring possible cost
savings effects of a reasonable notice statute that could partially offset increased employer
payments to workers during the required notice period); Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra
note 8, at 61–64, 69–71 (considering the possible impact of a reasonable notice rule on
employee wages and the demand for labor).
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of such a rule through drafting and what that might mean for employees.
Ultimately, it concludes that legislative codification may be the best
way to achieve a predictable and effective reasonable notice system. In
the meantime, common law notice can serve as a modest, if
inconsistent, source of protection for at-will employees.
A. Reasonableness and the Burdens of a Flexible Standard
Perhaps the most important and most troublesome question
concerning a common law reasonable notice rule is what constitutes
reasonable notice. The amount of notice required under such a rule will
determine how valuable the right is to workers, who stand to be its
principal beneficiaries, as well as the cost to be borne by employers,
who will have to pay additional wages to workers who might otherwise
have been fired immediately. The manner in which reasonable notice is
assessed will also determine the extent to which the rule burdens the
judicial system. Because reasonableness is a fluid and fact-specific
inquiry, one can expect litigation testing its contours.285
Concerns about the administerability of an open-ended
reasonableness test clearly underlie the expressed resistance to a
reasonable notice rule by those courts that have grappled with and
rejected the approach. The previously described retreat from Virginia’s
common law notice rule is an example. Speculating on the implications
of a reasonable notice rule, the federal district court in American Home
presaged a world in which this “new” cause of action “would permit
every discharged employee to sue the employer,” and because of the
fact-sensitive nature of the reasonableness inquiry, “every case filed
would have to be decided by the finder of fact.”286 The result, warned
the court in rejecting reasonable notice, would be the “eviscerat[ion]” of
employment at will.287
Given the limited extent to which reasonable notice has been
explored in the employment law jurisprudence, such concerns are not
unfounded. Employment cases requiring notice of at-will termination
are scarce, and most do not elaborate on the rule. Several courts simply
conclude that the notice provided by the employer was or was not

285. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 53 (recognizing that American
litigiousness combined with the absence of any domestic custom regarding reasonable notice
may make adoption of a context-dependent reasonable notice of employment termination rule
unworkable); Libenson, supra note 182, at 165–66 (rejecting Canada’s individual assessment of
reasonableness in proposing an American notice of employment termination rule).
286. Perry v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 3:96CV595, 1997 WL 109658, at *8–9 (E.D.
Va. 1997).
287. Id. at *9.
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reasonable.288 Others direct the claim to the fact finder without
providing guidance.289 Those that do allude to the meaning of
reasonableness are inconsistent and do not rely on any articulated policy
or theory. The key Florida case on this subject bases reasonableness on
the practices of the industry, perhaps out of fealty to historical cases
enforcing customary notice.290 Still another decision asserts that
reasonableness “depend[s] on the cause of the employee’s discharge.”291
However, precedent and experience from outside the employment
context, and outside of the United States, suggest that fears about the
erosion of employment at will are overstated. In contrast to employment
law, commercial law offers an explicit and consistent standard for
reasonable notice: the amount of time necessary for the terminated party
to replace the lost contract or otherwise mitigate the resulting loss.292
This might include finding a replacement supplier, unloading inventory,
and making workforce adjustments—whatever the terminated party
must do “to proceed in absence of the former relationship.”293
288. See, e.g., Settle v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 91-0028-CIV-ORl-18, 1992 WL
210986, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (concluding without analysis that four months was reasonable);
Malver v. Sheffield Indus., Inc., 462 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding
without analysis that one week was reasonable); Stubbs v. Vestry of St. John’s Church, 53 A.
917, 919 (Md. 1903) (concluding without analysis that two months was reasonable); Slade v.
Cent. Fid. Bank, 12 Va. Cir. 291, 291 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) (concluding that “no notice to an
employee of twenty-four years is prima facie unreasonable”).
289. See, e.g., Torres v. Consol. Bank, N.A., 653 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995). Other cases offer a mixed bag of possible standards. See, e.g., Rehman v. ECC Int’l
Corp., No. 90-425-Civ-Orl-22, 1993 WL 85758, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (referring to the length
of the pay period and evidence of custom, and concluding that reasonableness “requires the trier
of fact to consider all the circumstances of Plaintiff’s employment”). At least one court asserts
that no guidance (beyond reasonableness) is required, rejecting any requirement for expert
testimony regarding customs in the industry. See Braunfeld v. Forest Home Sys., 12 Va. Cir.
163, 1988 WL 619159, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) (concluding that the jury was competent to
reach its own conclusion on reasonableness of notice based on “common sense and collective
human experience”).
290. Perri v. Byrd, 436 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that the
defendant–employer owed two weeks’ pay based on “testimony of the parties indicat[ing] that
two weeks’ notice prior to termination is customary in the business”); see also Rehman, 1993
WL 85758, at *1 (denying summary judgment based on “genuine issues of fact regarding
customs in this industry . . . tending to show that no extended pay is available”). But cf.
Braunfeld, 1988 WL 619159, at *3 (rejecting the argument that testimony regarding industry
practices was necessary to determine reasonable notice).
291. Tingle v. Chasen’s Bus. Interiors, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 451, 1997 WL 33623611, at *3
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1997).
292. U.C.C. § 2-309(3) cmt. 8 (2012) (calling for “such notification . . . as will give the
other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement”); Pharo Distrib. Co. v. Stahl, 782
S.W.2d 635, 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he obvious object of the reasonable notice
requirement is to afford the party losing the contract an opportunity to make appropriate
arrangement in lieu thereof.”).
293. Pharo Distrib., 782 S.W.2d at 638.
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The viability of importing this standard to the employment context is
evidenced by Canadian employment law, which follows a substantially
similar rule. Under the Canadian common law notice rule, reasonable
notice of termination is based on the totality of circumstances, with an
emphasis on the employee’s ability to find replacement work.294 Courts
consider such factors as the worker’s age, duration of employment, and
the value of the worker’s skills.295 The length of the notice period (or
pay provided in lieu of notice) generally increases with the employee’s
age and length of service, factors that are likely to correlate inversely
with the degree of flexibility in the employee’s skills and the
transferability of his or her work experience.296 Notice periods are also
longer where the manner of termination reduces the worker’s chances of
reemployment.297 At the same time, courts consider factors that bear on
the overall fairness of the notice period with reference to the
relationship, including such things as the reason for the termination and
the financial situation of the employer.298 For this reason, no notice is
required in Canada where the employee is dismissed for misconduct,
notwithstanding the hardship of finding reemployment,299 and notice
may be reduced where the employer faces economic exigencies.300
Notwithstanding its fact-specific nature, an examination of the
Canadian rule in operation does not bear out the parade of horribles
envisioned in American Home. Rather, it appears that a developed body
of case law has yielded adequate guidance to Canadian employers and
294. See generally ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 311 (“In determining the period of
reasonable notice, [Canadian] courts have always placed paramount weight on whether or not
the employee can reasonably be expected to find replacement work, recognizing that employees
need a financial cushion to support them while they conduct a job search.”); Robert C. Bird &
Darren Charters, Good Faith and Wrongful Termination in Canada and the United States: A
Comparative and Relational Inquiry, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 205, 208 (2004) (“The basic premise
underlying common law reasonable notice [in Canada] is that the period should approximate the
period of time that the employee would need to find a new position.”).
295. See Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. 2d 140, paras. 13–19 (Can. Ont.
High Ct. J.) (enumerating factors to be considered in determining reasonableness).
296. See id.; ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 311–17.
297. For a time, an award could include punitive amounts based purely on an employer’s
bad faith conduct. See Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 745–46
(Can.); Bird & Charters, supra note 295, at 213–19 (surveying judicial application of Wallace).
But the Canadian Supreme Court subsequently clarified that such additional sums are allowable
only when the employee suffers actual harm or distress as a result of the bad faith treatment and
when such an injury was in the contemplation of the parties. See Honda Can. Inc. v. Keays,
2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362, 391–92 (Can.).
298. See G. England, Determining Reasonable Notice of Termination at Common Law: The
Implications of Cronk v. Canadian General Insurance Co., 4 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 115, 127–28
(1996) [hereinafter England, Determining Reasonable Notice]; ENGLAND, supra note 84, at
312–14; Bird & Charters, supra note 295, at 208.
299. See ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 324–43.
300. See England, Determining Reasonable Notice, supra note 299, at 127.
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their attorneys about the appropriate duration of notice in particular
cases. Litigation over common law notice is the exception rather than
the rule.301 Indeed, research suggests that American workers, subject
though they are to a strict employment at-will presumption, are more
likely to pursue legal claims post-termination than their Canadian
counterparts.302
Canadian employment law and American commercial law thus offer
established standards for reasonable notice. These standards are
consistent with the limited scope of the implied duty of good faith,
which can be invoked to limit contractual discretion but not to alter it.
Reasonable notice is defined with reference to replacement costs, not
the loss of the relationship itself. The rule’s flexibility ensures that the
amount of notice is tailored to the particular situation, giving the worker
adequate lead time while not overcompensating workers whose skills
are in high demand. It also attempts to balance the business interests of
the employer by accounting for the employee’s performance record and
the economic demands on the company.
While this flexibility is important in gauging the rights of
employees, it is even more critical in situations where the rule is
brought to bear on employee-initiated terminations. Any obligation to
provide notice based on the previously described contract theories
would necessarily be reciprocal. Implied terms, such as reasonable gap
fillers and the duty of good faith, apply to all parties, and bilateral
contract analysis requires the implication of a modicum of consideration
on both sides of the transaction. This means that employees, as well as
employers, would be obligated to supply reasonable notice prior to
exercising the right to terminate at will. Reasonable notice to an
employer, however, is likely to differ from reasonable notice to an
employee, particular if the key factor is the ability to replace the loss.
Employers are generally able to find substitute workers more easily than
301. See Bird & Charters, supra note 295, at 209 (“Typically, [a Canadian] employer can
determine an acceptable continuum of notice prior to termination and provide the employee with
notice or payment in lieu of notice that is within the acceptable range.”); England, Determining
Reasonable Notice, supra note 299, at 122 (noting that the majority of wrongful dismissal suits
are settled in negotiations before trial). A number of practitioners’ resources routinely
summarize judicial rulings on notice and a number of rubrics and guidelines are used for making
ex ante assessments. See, e.g., WRONGFUL DISMISSAL DATABASE ONLINE, available at
http://www.wrongfuldismissaldatabase.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) (offering a searchable
index of Canadian notice cases “designed to provide [attorneys] with a summary of the fair
severance details of the cases most relevant to [their client’s] situation”).
302. See Laura Beth Nielsen, Paying Workers or Paying Lawyers: Employee Termination
Practices in the United States and Canada, 21 LAW & POL’Y 247, 274 (1999). Of course, it is
impossible to know for certain whether Canada’s experience with reasonable notice could be
replicated in the United States. The difference in litigation rates documented in Nielsen’s
research may owe in part to systemic differences in the country’s legal system (such as the
lesser availability of jury trials, differences in recoverable damages, etc.) or to broader cultural
differences.
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an employee can find new work. At the same time, those factors under
Canada’s reasonable notice rule that consider the fairness of the notice
period in light of the parties’ relationship would allow for adjustments
based on specific circumstances. For instance, general considerations of
fairness would countenance an immediate quit in situations involving
serious employer mistreatment. Similarly, reduced notice would be
appropriate in the case of compelling personal circumstances
necessitating an employee’s sudden departure.
B. The Enforceablity of Express Limitations on Notice Rights
A second, and perhaps more significant, concern regarding the
efficacy of a common law notice rule is the degree to which parties can
contract around their implied notice obligations. A reasonable notice
system will likely impose some costs on employers, who might be
forced in particular situations to provide notice where they might
otherwise have terminated immediately.303 Moreover, the flexibility of a
reasonableness rule, even with judicial adoption of an articulable
standard, is likely to create a degree of uncertainty regarding the
propriety of any particular termination. One would expect some, if not
many, employers to try to avoid these problems through written
agreements. The enforceability of such contracts at common law will
therefore be an important determinant of the value of any judicially
recognized reasonable notice right.
1. “Contracting Out” of Reasonable Notice
Efforts to control the economic and administrative consequences of a
reasonable notice rule could take several forms, not all of which will
necessarily be in derogation of employee rights. One possibility is that
employers will seek to resolve questions of reasonableness at the point
of exit through severance and release agreements. In Canada, it is
standard practice for an employer to provide a lump sum payment in
fulfillment of its advance notice obligation and obtain a release from
further liability.304 Although a conventional reading of American
303. One might suppose that in such situations the salary paid to the employee, either
during the notice period or in the form of severance pay, will represent a net loss to the
employer. In reality, however, there are many ways in which a notice regime might produce cost
savings to employers. For instance, advance notice may give an employee a funded opportunity
to find alternate employment, thereby reducing the employer’s unemployment insurance
premiums, or it may reduce the likelihood that the employee will seek to dispute the
termination, thereby reducing litigation costs. I have explored the possible cost-savings effects
of a reasonable notice rule at length elsewhere. See Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra
note 8, at 320–22. For purposes of this Article, I will assume that employers will incur at least
some costs in the context of some terminations.
304. Nielsen, supra note 303, at 273.
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common law does not so require, U.S. employers frequently choose to
provide severance pay to terminated workers, generally in exchange for
releases of other types of claims.305 Employers could simply fold notice
claims into those agreements, which would be enforceable provided the
requisite contract formalities are met.306
A more troubling possibility is that employers might seek to limit or
even eliminate their reasonable notice obligations at the outset of the
relationship. The preference for express notice provisions likely
explains, at least in part, the relative dearth of cases disputing the
reasonableness of notice in indefinite business and commercial
contracts. Sophisticated parties presumably place a premium on the
certainty they can achieve by negotiating their termination rights in
advance, and doing so may not be especially costly if they intend to
produce a written contract regardless. In the employment context,
however, advance planning of this variety is likely to take the form of
standardized, employer-drafted agreements providing that workers will
receive little or no notice upon termination.307
305. See LEE HECHT HARRISON, SEVERANCE & SEPARATION PRACTICES: BENCHMARK
STUDY 2008–2009 1, 4–5 (2008), available at http://www.lhhitalia.com/it/Documents/LHH_
SevStudy08.pdf.
306. Of course, employers seeking simultaneous waivers of age discrimination claims
would have to go beyond contract formalities to comply with the heightened duties mandated by
the Older Workers’ Benefits Protection Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1), (1)(H) (2006) (requiring
that employee waivers of Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims be “knowing and
voluntary” and obliging employers to provide statistical information enabling employees to
assess the viability of possible claims). It is also possible that employers would want to provide
a severance premium beyond the amount of pay associated with the reasonable notice period in
order to ensure consideration for waivers of additional claims extracted from the worker,
although the provision of a lump sum payment in lieu of future wages could arguably serve that
purpose.
307. This risk is not limited to the notice context. I have written elsewhere about
employers’ use of standard forms to impose covenants not to compete and predispute arbitration
agreements, as have others. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 225, at
638–39; Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility, supra note 225, at 963–
66; Estlund, Between Rights and Contract, supra note 225, at 380–82; Daniel Roy, Mandatory
Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347, 1359–60 (1999); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Private Resolution
of Public Disputes: Employment, Arbitration, and the Statutory Cause of Action, 32 PACE L.
REV. 114, 125–27 (2012); Jon H. Sylvester, Validity of Post-Employment Non-Compete
Covenants in Broadcast News Employment Contracts, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 423, 454
(1989). That said, it is possible that commentators overstate the likelihood that employers will
draft around their legal obligations. Large employers who are knowledgeable in the law and
already maintain an infrastructure for producing and administering form employment
agreements may be likely to add “no notice” provisions to their documents. But less
sophisticated employers with informal personnel practices may not. In addition, all employers
will have to weigh the reputational effects, if any, of insisting on a complete relinquishment of
this right. Ultimately, the question of how employers respond to adverse law is, of course, an
empirical one that is contextually dependent. For purposes of this section, I will assume that a
subset of employers will seek to obtain a complete waiver of employee notice rights.
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The effectiveness of an employer-drafted provision eliminating or
constraining employee notice rights depends in part on the contractual
theory through which a reasonable notice rule is adopted. As previously
discussed, the various doctrinal pathways through which courts might
imply reasonable notice are not equal in terms of the strength of the
resulting rule. A straight gap filler analysis yields a simple default that
by definition can be altered though drafting, while a good faith analysis
results in a more robust rule, though one that is in theory still
subservient to the express terms of the parties’ contract.308 The implied
consideration theory therefore offers the only doctrinal hook for voiding
some forms of employer opt out. In the face of a “no notice” provision,
a court applying the illusory contract theory might find it necessary to
“save” the employment contract by implying some form of reasonable
obligation notwithstanding the “no notice” language.
On the other hand, the argument for such a move in the face of a
limited notice contract is far less sound. A promise to provide even the
most modest amount of notice would presumably supply the requisite
consideration for a binding contract. In the case of a contract specifying
a truly nominal amount of consideration—one hour, one minute, or
even one second—there might be a basis for treating the consideration
as nominal, consistent with the idea that sham consideration does not
represent a true bargained-for exchange.309 Courts, however, are well
versed in the familiar interdiction against evaluating the adequacy of
consideration and may be unwilling to take this route.310 Thus, while the
308. See supra Part III.
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. d (1981) (“Disparity in
value . . . sometimes indicates that the purported consideration was not in fact bargained for but
was a mere formality or pretense. Such a sham or ‘nominal’ consideration does not satisfy the
requirement of § 71.”); Sfreddo v. Sfreddo, 720 S.E.2d 145, 154 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]t has
been recognized that where no bargain actually occurred as evidenced by nominal or sham
consideration and the surrounding circumstances, the purported consideration is not in fact
consideration.”).
310. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c (“Valuation is left to private
action in part because the parties are thought to be better able than others to evaluate the
circumstances of particular transactions. . . . Ordinarily, therefore, courts do not inquire into the
adequacy of consideration.”); id. § 71 cmt. c (“Ordinarily . . . courts do not inquire into the
adequacy of consideration, particularly where one or both of the values exchanged are difficult
to measure.”); Sirius LC v. Erickson, 244 P.3d 224, 229 (Idaho 2010) (stating that the Court
would not inquire into the adequacy of consideration “so long as some consideration is
provided”); Tanton v. Grochow, 707 N.E.2d 1010, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (declining to
inquire into the adequacy of consideration and deferring to the judgment of the parties where the
consideration was “of an indeterminate value . . . agreed upon by the parties”); Horace Mann
Ins. Co. v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 344 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Va. 1986) (“[P]arties to a contract are at
liberty to determine their own valuations, and courts generally will not inquire into the adequacy
of consideration.”). The notion of a written contract requiring negligible notice recalls the
“minute” contracts frequently imposed on workers during the nineteenth century as a means of
preventing them from engaging in sudden work stoppages. See Feinman, Employment At Will,
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contention of this Article is that reasonable notice may not be fully
waived, litigants must anticipate that many courts will defer to
employers’ standard clauses on this issue.
2. Unconscionability and “No Notice” Provisions
If employers attempt to contract out of reasonable notice, and if
courts are willing to defer to such provisions, the enforceability of
employers’ written terms will turn on the worker’s ability to
demonstrate a contractual defense such as unconscionability. Generally
speaking, unconscionability imposes a high bar on those seeking to
avoid enforcement of express contract terms. A party must show that
the term in question is substantively unfair in that it is oppressive and
overreaching, and that the contract was procedurally defective, that is,
that there was a lack of knowing consent in the bargaining process.311
Most courts require a party to establish both prongs of the defense,312
and although unconscionability is frequently asserted, it is rarely
successful.313
supra note 17, at 121–22; Jacoby, supra note 28, at 98. It does not appear that such contracts
were ever challenged from a consideration perspective, but courts did assume them to be
binding.
311. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 194 (Cal. 2013) (“[T]he
doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element . . . .”); Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“Unconscionability has
generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”); 7
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4 (rev. ed. 2002); Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487
(1967) (defining unconscionability as defects in the bargaining process, or “procedural
unconscionability,” and defects in the resulting bargain, or “substantive unconscionability”).
312. See Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and
Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 155 (2005) (noting that courts have been reluctant to
find unconscionability where only procedural unconscionability is present); Steven Goldberg,
Unconscionability in a Commercial Setting: The Assessment of Risk in a Contract to Build
Nuclear Reactors, 58 WASH. L. REV. 343, 349 (1983) (“Courts generally will not void a clause
unless they find both substantive unconscionability—a bargain that appears dramatically
uneven—and procedural unconscionability—a defect in how a bargain is reached.”); Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1203, 1256–57 (2003) (“[M]ost courts have held that the doctrine may be invoked only on
a finding of both imperfections in the bargaining process, known as ‘procedural
unconscionability,’ and an unfairly one-sided term, referred to as ‘substantive
unconscionability.’”).
313. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2006) (finding that the
unconscionability defense succeeded in only 37.8% of sampled cases); see also James R.
Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives,
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 119 (2003) (stating that a party only needs to show that the other party
was aware of a term to overcome an unconscionability defense, and that unconscionability was
intended to impose “a hurdle higher than unfairness”); Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing
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Even so, there is reason to expect that at least some courts will be
receptive to an unconscionability challenge in cases involving a
unilaterally drafted provision that eliminates or deeply constrains the
employee’s right to notice. Such an analysis is specifically
contemplated under the UCC. Section 2-309 constrains parties’ ability
to contract out of the default reasonable notice term by providing that
“an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation
would be unconscionable.”314 This reference to unconscionablity in the
text of a provision setting forth a particular contract term is notable
given that the UCC already establishes unconscionability as a universal
defense applicable to any agreement. Section 2-302 provides that a
court may refuse to enforce a contract or any part of a contract if “as a
matter of law [it] finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made.”315 Thus, there is no need
to restate the availability of the unconscionability defense in § 2-309,
unless the drafters intended such clauses to receive special scrutiny.
Indeed, § 2-309 appears to impose a lower threshold for
unconscionability than § 2-302, referring to written provisions that are
unconscionable
in
“operation.”316
Whereas
the
standard
unconscionability inquiry examines the situation of the parties at the
time of contracting, § 2-309 looks at the consequences of the clause to
the adversely affected party.317 The operative question is whether the
failure to provide reasonable notice consistent with the parties’ express
terms created an “unconscionable state of affairs.”318 This may be the
case even where an objective assessment of the parties’ situation at the
time of drafting indicates that a party was adequately compensated for
assuming the risk of an immediate termination.
Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 75 (2006) (observing that courts
have become “increasingly rigid in their application of a two-prong unconscionability test”);
Rebecca Schonberg, Introducing “Abusive”: A New and Improved Standard for Consumer
Protection, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1415 (2012) (“[C]ourts have generally applied the
unconscionability doctrine narrowly.”).
314. U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (2012).
315. U.C.C. § 2-302.
316. U.C.C. § 2-309(3).
317. See generally PERILLO, supra note 312, § 29.6. The only other section of Article 2 that
specifically refers to the availability of an unconscionability defense is § 2-719 regarding
liquidated damages provisions. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (“Consequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.”). There too, the drafters of the
UCC appear to sanction a lesser showing than that typically required to establish an
unconscionability defense. See generally PERILLO, supra note 312, § 29.5.
318. U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 8; see PERILLO, supra note 312, § 29.6 (“Subsection [2-309](3)
addresses the conscionability of a termination. It does not address the conscionability of a
termination clause.” (emphasis omitted)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

65

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2

1578

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

There is almost no reported case law examining the applicability of
UCC § 2-309 in the context of a written waiver of the reasonable notice
obligation. However, a federal district court case involving a patent
dispute provides an example of why such clauses might be considered
unconscionable in a business relationship, and a fortiori, in an
employment situation. In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,319 chip-maker
Intel was found to have breached its contract with Intergraph, a
manufacturer of computer workstations, by terminating the relationship
despite a provision in the parties agreement, which the court interpreted
as permitting termination without notice.320 The court based its decision
on the investment Intergraph had made in configuring its machines to
accept Intel chips, a production choice that had involved years of
research and development time.321 The combination of Integraph’s sunk
costs and Intel’s market share meant that it was virtually impossible for
Integraph to stay in business without continued access to Intel products
and the proprietary information necessary to work with them.322 Thus,
allowing Intel to exercise the termination clause without significant
advance warning to Integraph would have created an unconscionable
state of affairs.323
Not every court would necessarily take this approach with respect to
notice, at least not in the commercial context. Indeed, the district court’s
opinion in Integraph was ultimately vacated by the Federal Circuit,
which heard the case on appeal pursuant to its patent law jurisdiction.324
In a decision based almost entirely on antitrust law, the court rejected
the district court’s conclusion that Intel’s behavior had been in restraint
of trade and took issue with its authority to compel continued
performance of the contract.325 In its brief consideration of contract
principles, the circuit court characterized unconscionability as an
“extraordinary remedy,” designed to protect consumers and other
“uneducated” parties, with limited relevance to the commercial

319. 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
320. Id. at 1287. The contract provided for termination “at any time without cause upon
notice to the other party,” but did not explicitly state that termination could occur “without
notice.” Id. at 1266. However, the court subjected this language to the unconscionability test
applicable to “agreement[s] dispensing with notification” under § 2-309, implicitly interpreting
the parties’ contract as permitting termination without notice. Id. at 1285.
321. See id. at 1261–62.
322. See id. at 1263.
323. The court also noted that in addition to its powerful position in the industry generally,
Intel had unilaterally drafted the parties’ agreements. See id. at 1271 (“These NDAs are
documents drafted by Intel and presented to Intergraph and other customers on a take-it-orleave-it basis. Intel simply dictates the terms under which it provides its products . . . .”).
324. Integraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
325. Id. at 1354–55.
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context.326 It made no mention of UCC § 2-309’s explicit reference to
unconscionability as a backstop to parties’ ability to limit notice, or
even § 2-302, the UCC’s umbrella unconscionability provision that
governs all aspects of commercial contracts. Indeed, the court did not
mention the UCC at all.
Whatever the merits of the Federal Circuit’s ultimate conclusions
regarding Intel, the district court’s analysis provides some indication of
how courts might respond to a “no notice” provision in an employment
contract. Employment is a paradigmatic example of an unequal
bargaining relationship in which one party has limited choice with
regard to the terms of the relationship. That is generally not enough for
unconscionability: employees can choose not to deal on terms they find
objectionable by refusing employment that includes a “no notice”
provision. But UCC § 2-309 pushes the relevant inquiry to the moment
in time at which termination is effected. The question is not the
constraints that existed at the time of contract formation, but rather the
effect of the contract provision, a nuance that the Federal Circuit failed
to consider. In the context of employment, a “no notice” provision,
which would allow a company to immediately cut off an individual
worker’s only stream of income without any advance warning or
continuing obligations, presents a stark example of what the UCC
would likely conceive of as “an unconscionable state of affairs.”327
326. Id. at 1365 (quoting Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So. 2d 713, 717 (Ala.
1989)).
327. U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 8 (2012). By way of comparison, Canadian employers have at
times made efforts to reduce or eliminate notice obligations by contract and have been met with
limited success. See Etherington, supra note 29, at 461–69 (reviewing Canadian case law
involving challenges to written waivers of notice). However, in Canada, provincial statutes
provide for minimum notice periods which may not be waived. See, e.g., Ontario Employment
Standards Act, S.O. 2000, c. 41, § 5(1) (Can.) (“[N]o employer . . . shall contract out of or waive
an employment standard and any such contracting out or waiver is void.”), available at
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_00e41_e.htm#BK7.
Where
waiver is attempted, courts will treat the provision as void and apply the common law
reasonable notice rule. See Machtinger v. HOJ Indus., [1992] S.C.R. 1001 (Can.); Christensen v.
Family Counseling Ctr. of Sault Ste. Marie and Dist., [2001] 151 O.A.C. para. 8 (Can. Ont.
C.A.); MacDonald v. ADGA Sys. Int’l Ltd., [1999)] O.A.C. para. 17 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Because
of this statutory overlay, Canadian cases do not present the precise question of the enforceability
of an absolute waiver of common law notice rights resulting in a termination without notice.
However, a fair reading appears to be that total waivers of the common law right, to the extent
that they can be disentangled from statutory waivers, are unenforceable or at least narrowly
construed. See Marchen v. Dams Ford Lincoln Sales Ltd., [2010] BCCA 29, para. 39 (B.C.C.A.)
(“[T]he provision [allowing termination without consent] confirms the common law right to
terminate a non-fixed term contract, but it does not obviate the need to give reasonable notice.”);
Ceccol v. Ont. Gymnastic Fed’n, [2001] O.A.C. 315, paras. 2, 44–45 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (finding
that an employment contract stating that the Employment Standards Act governed certain
terminations was not clear enough to “successfully rebut[] the common law presumption of
reasonable notice”). But see MacDonald, [1999] O.A.C. at para. 24 (finding that because a
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C. A Legislative Solution?
The previous sections offer preliminary strategies for addressing two
potentially problematic implications of a common law reasonable notice
regime. Whether such strategies prove successful remains to be seen. It
will take years for courts to develop an understanding of what
constitutes reasonable notice in particular circumstances, and issues of
waiver and unconscionability will have to be litigated and tested. At
best, there will be some period of uncertainty, during which it will be
difficult for parties to predict how best to handle termination decisions.
And, of course, there is no guarantee that courts will be willing to
accept a robust theory of reasonable notice rights. If employers choose
to use waivers aggressively and courts ultimately prove hostile to
employee unconscionabiltiy claims, it is possible that the power
imbalance created and perpetuated by the current employment at-will
rule will play out to the same effect within a reasonable notice regime.
Given these concerns, legislation that codifies and clarifies parties’
reasonable notice obligations may be desirable. Examples are easy to
discover. Laws requiring employers to provide advance notice of
termination (or its equivalent in pay) abound in Europe, where they
comprise part of the larger scheme of employment protection regulation
within individual nations.328 Mandatory notice statutes also exist in the
Canadian provinces and federal jurisdiction, where they operate in
tandem with that country’s common law reasonable notice rule,
requiring a base amount of notice or pay that may be supplemented
under the common law based on the peculiarities of the particular
case.329
Adopting a statutory notice law will obviate many of the
administrative challenges posed by a common law reasonable notice
rule. The fixed periods contained in such laws will provide clear
guidance to employers and are unlikely to give rise to additional
wrongful discharge litigation.330 At the same time, fixed notice periods
contract provision limiting notice to not less than one month did not violate the statutory
minimum, the written provision could displace common law reasonable notice).
328. See, e.g., Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 86 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/section/86; BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB]
[CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] I, § 622 (Ger.), available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p2546. For a summary of
the notice rights created by some of these laws, see Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8,
at 54–57.
329. See, e.g., Ontario Employment Standards Act, S.O. 2000, c. 41, § 57 (Can.). See
generally ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 289–324 (describing the relationship between these
sources of obligations).
330. In fact, such laws may reduce litigation. Workers who receive advance notice (or
severance pay) may be less likely to invoke wrongful discharge claims as a means of addressing
the sudden loss of income occasioned by an immediate termination. They may also feel more
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are likely in many cases to lead to results similar to what would be
achieved under a fact-specific reasonableness standard. The statutory
notice laws of most nations use length of service as the benchmark for
determining the amount of required notice. This measure is likely to
reasonably approximate the loss to the employee under the theory that
long-standing employees have a stronger property interest in their jobs
or suffer a greater wrong than their more junior counterparts. Length of
service may also serve as a proxy for employability, given that
employees who over time gain firm specific skills are likely to be more
valuable to their current employer than to the general market.331 Thus,
what statutory periods sacrifice in terms of the close fit between the
requisite notice and particular factual circumstances may well be worth
the gain in administerability and certainty of outcome.
At the same time, a legislative approach would allow policy makers
to impose additional obligations or constraints to ensure the
effectiveness of its notice regime. Any legislation requiring
pretermination notice could also prevent employers from contracting
out of that obligation, either by making the right to notice nonwaivable
or by imposing meaningful procedural or substantive limitations on
such efforts.332 Notice legislation could also clarify the obligations of
voluntarily separated workers. Under such a statute, the legislature
could mandate more modest notice periods for departing workers and
delineate exceptions under which such obligations would be excused.
Alternatively, the legislature could supersede the common law and
provide that departing workers have no obligation to provide any notice
to employers.
The project of developing and vetting possible statutory proposals is
one I have pursued elsewhere, and it will not be further considered in
this Article.333 It should be noted, however, that the recognition of a
fairly treated and consequently less likely to sue. See Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra
note 8, at 321 (suggesting that some workers may use wrongful discharge litigation as a way “to
address the legitimate hardship and perceived unfairness of at-will termination”).
331. See ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 311 (describing factors examined under the Canadian
reasonable notice rule, including “age and the degree to which skills and experience are firm
specific,” which courts consider indicative of “whether or not the employee can reasonably be
expected to find replacement work”); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating
Just Cause and Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 13 (1993) (describing the “basic
human-capital model” under which workers invest in learning the ways of the firm, becoming
more productive as their employment tenure increases). To the extent years of service correlates
with age, it also implicitly addresses the possibility that bias will impact the ability of older
workers to find new work.
332. I elaborate on the possible means by which legislators can restrict employers’ ability
to contract out of a statutory notice obligation in prior articles. See Arnow-Richman, Just
Notice, supra note 8, at 66–69.
333. See Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra note 8, passim; Arnow-Richman, Just
Notice, supra note 8, passim.
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common law cause of action may be a necessary first-step toward
securing support for legislative reform. Ad hoc adoption of a common
law notice obligation tied to a fact-specific reasonableness standard
could produce a state of uncertainty sufficient to inspire interest in a
statutory mandate among employers. Such an alignment between
management and labor in favor of employee-protective legislation
occurred briefly during the 1980s in response to judicial innovations in
the area of wrongful discharge law.334 Fear of a flood of employeeinitiated litigation prompted employers to briefly support compromise
legislation establishing a just cause termination standard in exchange for
limited remedies and preemption of other common law claims.335
Ultimately, such coalitions proved unsuccessful in most states,336 but
their existence illustrates the potential for statutory reform achieved
through shared interest and compromise. If the chaos of a common law
reasonable notice claim inspires a bipartisan move toward a statutory
mandate, it will have served a valuable purpose.
CONCLUSION
This Article has exposed a fundamental mistake in employment
doctrine, as well as a paradox in contract law jurisprudence.
Contemporary employment law has developed under the assumption
that at-will parties may terminate their relationship both without reason
and without notice. This Article has demonstrated that the latter
component of the rule—the idea that parties enjoy absolute procedural
as well as substantive discretion to terminate—is neither legally correct
nor historically supported. An examination of general contract law
reveals precisely the opposite. In a variety of nonemployment contexts,
and using a number of different contract theories, courts imply or
impose on parties to an indefinite relationship a duty to provide
reasonable notice of termination. Such an obligation serves not only as a
gap filler in the face of contractual silence, but as a good faith limitation
334. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69
WASH. L. REV. 361, 367, 370 (1994) (discussing the development of the Model Employment
Termination Act, which proposes a just cause dismissal standard coupled with streamlined
procedures and limited remedies, and which was designed as compromise legislation in
response to judicial decisions recognizing employee implied contract claims).
335. In retrospect it appears that such concerns by employers were unfounded, see Lauren
B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful
Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 67 (1992) (describing the degree to which management
overemphasized the risk of implied contract liability relative to employee success rates in
bringing such claims), which may explain in part why the model statute was ultimately
unsuccessful.
336. See St. Antoine, supra note 335, at 380–81 (discussing limited prospects for META’s
enactment). The only state where just cause legislation ultimately succeeded was Montana. See
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -915 (West
2013).
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on parties’ exercise of substantive discretion, one that may not be
waived without sacrificing the modicum of consideration necessary to
create a binding relationship.
In the face of this divergence, this Article lays the groundwork for a
more unified body of contract law and a more generous system of
common law protection for workers. The notion of a uniform contract
law is a contested one; the numerous situations where principles of
voluntary exchange must operate are arguably too diverse and contextspecific to be mediated by a single set of abstract rules. But deviations,
where necessary, are best justified as a means of counteracting power
imbalances by fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the party in the
weaker bargaining position. Employment-specific contract rules, as they
currently stand, do precisely the opposite. The result is that workers are
treated worse than commercial parties dealing at arms’ length in
sophisticated transactions.
Ultimately, this Article seeks to leverage contract law to fashion an
obligation to supply advance notice of employment termination, one
that, while reciprocal, will inure primarily to the benefit of employees.
While employees would still be subject to termination at the whim of
the employer, they would at least receive advance warning and some
income continuation to ease their transition. The arguments laid out here
are the first step; it remains for lawyers and judges to do the rest.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF STATE NOTICE LAW
This appendix categorizes each state according to its treatment of
advance notice of termination in the context of at-will employment.
States listed as “no notice” states are those in which one or more
decisions either hold or support the conclusion that parties to at-will
employment relationships may terminate without notice. This category
also includes states in which a state statute supports the inference that
at-will employment relationships may be terminated without notice.
States listed as “reasonable notice” states are those in which one or
more decisions either hold or support the conclusion that parties to atwill employment relationships must provide advance notice of
termination. States listed at “open” states are those in which there
appear to be no cases addressing the issue of notice of termination in atwill relationships, nor any cases from which a particular notice rule may
be inferred. States listed as “mixed law” states are those in which there
are one or more decisions that support the conclusion that employment
at will may be terminated without notice, as well as one or more
decisions that support the conclusion that advance notice of termination
is required.
“No Notice” States (9)
Alabama
Colorado
Hawaii
Montana
Michigan
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
South Dakota
“Reasonable Notice” States (3)
California
Florida
Maryland
“Open” States (30)
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
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Connecticut337
Delaware
Georgia
Idaho338
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Minnesota
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey339
New Mexico
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
337. There is a Superior Court case in Connecticut rejecting an at-will employee’s claim
for negligent inflection of emotional distress in which the court observed that "lack of advance
warning or written notification is insufficient evidence that an employer acted unreasonably in
terminating an employee-at-will.” Thompson v. Bridgeport Hosp., 1999 WL 1212310 (Conn.
Super.). However, the decision, which ruled on defendant’s motion to strike, addressed only the
plaintiff’s negligence claim and not her contract claims. In addition, the plaintiff had received
both advance warning that her department was closing and one month’s oral notice of her date
of termination.
338. There is a State Supreme Court case in Idaho stating that employment at will permits
termination “without cause at any time, assuming any notice requirements are met.” Thomas v.
Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 442 P.2d 747, 751 (Idaho 1968). Most likely the court is referring to
express contractual notice obligations.
339. There is one early twentieth century decision in New Jersey that rejects a claim based
on the failure to provide notice of termination, but while the court refers to the termination as “at
will” it appears that the employee was terminated pursuant to a satisfaction clause in the
contract permitting immediate termination upon his unreasonable delay. See Miller v. Atlantic
City, 74 N.J.L. 345, 347 (N.J. 1907). There appears to be no other articulation of the
employment at-will rule by a New Jersey state court that refers to the right to terminate without
notice.
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“Mixed Law” States (8)
Louisiana340
Massachusetts341
Missouri342
New York 343
Pennsylvania344
Tennessee345
340. Louisiana’s code provides that indefinite contracts may be terminated at will upon
reasonable notice. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (2013). Courts and commentators,
however, have offered different views as to whether this provision of general contract law
applies to employment relationships. Compare Carlson v. Superior Supply Co., 536 So. 2d 444,
446 (La. Ct. App. 1988), and 6 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 22:4 (West,
updated Apr. 2014), available at Westlaw EDC ANAREL § 22:4, with Finkle v. Majik Mkt.,
628 So. 2d 259, 260, 262 (La. Ct. App. 1993), Harrison v. CD Consulting, Inc. 2006 WL
1194749 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.), and LOUISIANA PRACTICE: EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12:7 (2013–
14). See generally supra Section II.C.
341. There are several contemporary cases in Massachusetts that characterize at-will
employment as the right to terminate without notice; there is also older case law in the state that
refers to a “reasonable notice” requirement. Compare Jackson v. Action for Bos. Cmty. Dev.,
Inc., 525 N.E.2d 411, 412–13 (Mass. 1988), with Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass. 187, 187–90
(1873).
342. In Missouri, there are at least two twentieth century cases stating that employment
contracts of indefinite duration are terminable upon “reasonable notice.” See Paisley v. Lucas,
143 S.W.2d 262, 271 (Mo. 1940); Clarkson v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 170 S.W.2d 407, 415
(Mo. Ct. App. 1943). However, a turn-of-the-century decision, rejecting a claim by workers
terminated without notice and blacklisted for union activity, asserts that “in a free country like
ours every employ[ee] . . . has the legal right to quit the service of his employer without notice,
and either with or without cause, . . . [and] any employer may legally discharge his employ[ee],
with or without notice, at any time.” Boyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246, 247–48 (E.D. Mo.
1903).
343. In New York, there is at least one nineteenth-century case accepting the principle that
customary notice is due to a terminated at-will worker where the custom can be factually
established. See Hathaway v. Bennett, 6 Seld. 108, 113 (NY 1854). There is also at least one
contemporary case holding that advance notice of at-will termination is not required, albeit in a
case involving employer breach of loyalty claims against departing employees. See Town &
Country House & Home Serv. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724, 728 (N.Y. 1958). There are several
other New York cases referring to the ability to terminate without notice in dicta. Horn v. N.Y.
Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755, 758–59 (N.Y. 2003); Kotick v. Desai, 123 A.D.2d 744, 744–45
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Grozek v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 63 A.D.2d 858, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
See generally supra Section II.C.
344. In Pennsylvania, there is a nineteenth-century state supreme court case rejecting a
claim based on failure to provide notice, see Cofin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 434; 1864 WL 4617
(1864); supra Section I.B, as well as a contemporary trial court case reciting as the general rule
that parties may terminate at will “upon reasonable notice,” see Neal v. Altoona Hosp., 38 Pa. D
& C 599, 601 (1985).
345. In Tennessee, there is one case purporting to define employment at will as including
the right to terminate without notice, and at least one case in which the court “assumes” that
“reasonable notice” is a prerequisite to terminating an at at-will employee. Compare Lee v. City
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Texas346
Virginia347

of LaVergne, No. M2001-02098-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 1610831, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003),
with Roberts v. Fed. Express Corp., 1991 WL 104203, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
346. At least one older Texas case cites the general contract principal that termination must
occur on “reasonable notice”; however, in the case itself the issue was whether the employee
had actual knowledge of termination, not advance knowledge. See Island Lake Oil Co. v.
Hewitt, 244 S.W. 193, 194–95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). Other Texas cases refer to termination
“on notice” and the ability to terminate “by giving notice,” both of which suggest the law
merely requires actual notice. See, e.g., McKinney v. Smith, 271 S.W. 247, 247–49 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925). Still, other cases refer to termination with “no notice” and termination on
“reasonably short notice.” Compare Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1993)
(Hecht, J., concurring), with Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.
1987).
347. Virginia has several cases that apply or refer to a “reasonable notice” requirement, but
also cases that explicitly reject the theory that there is an independent cause of action for failure
to provide advance notice. Compare Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
55 S.E. 551, 552 (Va. 1906), with Perry v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 3:96CV595, 1997 WL
109658, at *8–9 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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APPENDIX B: NOTICE OF TERMINATION CASES
This appendix contains select cases that discuss or refer to notice of
termination in the context of at-will employment. Cases listed as
“reasonable notice” cases either hold that reasonable notice of at-will
termination is required or support such a conclusion by inference or in
dicta. Those cases listed as “no notice” cases either hold that at-will
employment may be terminated without notice or support such a
conclusion by inference or in dicta. “Contemporary cases” are those
dating from 1960 to the present. “Historical cases” are those decided
prior to 1960.
1. “REASONABLE NOTICE” CASES
a. Cases Recognizing or Presuming a Right to Reasonable Notice of
Termination of At-Will Employment
i. Contemporary Cases
Florida
Rehman v. ECC Int’l Corp., 1993 WL 85758, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(concluding that issues of fact regarding industry custom precluded
summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim based on failure to provide
reasonable notice or continued pay).
Roebuck & Co., No. 91-0028-Civ-Orl-18, 1992 WL 210986, at *5
(M.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that the employer provided four months’
advance notice of termination consistent with its obligation to provide
reasonable notice in rejecting employee’s claim of breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
Malver v. Sheffield Industries, Inc., 502 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (upholding trial court’s decision that employer complied
with reasonable notice obligation by providing employee one-week’s
severance pay).
Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., P.A., 490 So. 2d 993, 996–97 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a prospective employee who
relocated from Britain for a job offer could be awarded damages arising
from the defendant-accounting firm’s failure to provide reasonable
notice of termination of the employment offer); cf. Settle v. Sears, 990
F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1993).
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Perri v. Byrd, 436 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that restaurant was required to provide two-week’s notice to terminated
musicians and awarding damages equaling two-weeks’ salary).
Tennessee
Roberts v. Federal Exp. Corp., 1991 WL 104203, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1991) (presuming that at-will employees are entitled to reasonable
notice of termination in concluding that maintenance mechanic accused
of stealing customer property would not have been entitled to notice
because he was terminated for cause).
Virginia
Studer v. Hurley, 82 Va. Cir. 406, 407 (2011) (“One of the incidents of
employment at will is the ability of either party to terminate the
relationship with or without cause at any time, upon giving reasonable
notice.”).
Rubin v. Maloney, 75 Va. Cir. 452, 453 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007) (“Virginia
has long adhered to the common law doctrine of employment ‘at will’
where when a term of employment cannot be determined from the
contract, either party is at liberty to terminate the contract at any time
for any reason, upon reasonable notice.”).
Tingle v. Chasen’s Bus. Interiors, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 451, at *3 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 1997) (permitting plaintiff’s claim based on employer’s failure to
provide reasonable notice of at-will termination; reasonableness to be
determined based on the cause for discharge).
Laudenslager v. Loral, 39 Va. Cir. 228, 229, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 140
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1996) (noting that Virginia law requires “each party to an
employment relationship to give the other reasonable notice of
termination unless there is an agreement or understanding to the
contrary” in recognizing action for breach of an implied contract).
Braunfeld v. Forest Home Sys., 12 Va. Cir. 163, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct.
1988) (holding that the jury properly awarded $3,731.41 in damages to
the employee for unpaid expenses, outstanding commissions, and the
employer’s failure to give reasonable notice of termination).
Slade v. Cent. Fid. Bank, N.A., 12 Va. Cir. 291 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988)
(concluding that “no notice to an employee of twenty-four years is
prima facie unreasonable” in permitting teller’s claim for bank’s failure
to provide reasonable notice of at-will termination).
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ii. Historical Cases
Illinois
Gray v. Wulff, 68 Ill. App. 376, 377–78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1896) (permitting
termination of orchestra leader on one week’s notice, concluding that
employer “had the right to discharge [the plaintiff] on giving him the
usual and customary notice . . . independent of the question whether he
was competent” to remain employed).
Maryland
Stubbs v. Vestry of St. John’s Church, 96 Md. 267 (Md. App. 1903)
(finding that rector’s appointment contract contained no fixed term of
employment and could therefore be terminated at will upon reasonable
notice, which had been received).
Bartlett v. Hipkins, 24 A. 532, 532 (1892) (concurrence) (noting that
while statutory law permitted vestry to terminate its minister, “the right
must always be exercised with due regard to the principles of justice,
depending upon the circumstances of the case. Reasonable notice is
essential.”).
Massachusetts
Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass. 187 (Mass. 1873) (rejecting claim by
paint maker that he had been hired for a fixed term and concluding that
the defendants could terminate the employment agreement “at any time
by reasonable notice”).
New York
Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108, 113 (1854) (accepting the principle
that customary notice is due to a terminated at-will worker, but finding
that the plaintiff–newspaper carrier had not established a custom of
providing one month’s notice).
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b. Cases Reciting that At-Will Employment Permits Termination “Upon
Reasonable Notice”
i. Contemporary Cases
Louisiana
Carlson v. Superior Supply Co., 536 So. 2d 444, 446 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (asserting in an employment termination case that “[a] contract
for an indefinite period is terminable at the will of either party upon
giving reasonable notice”).
Pennsylvania
Neal v. Altoona Hosp., 38 Pa. D. & C.3d 599, 601 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
1985) (“An employment contract which has no definite duration is a
hiring at-will, and may be terminated upon reasonable notice by either
party at any time.”).
Tennessee
Hutchings v. Jobe, Hastings & Assocs., 2011 WL 3566972, at *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2011) (“It has been well-established that Tennessee is an atwill employment state, meaning that the Employer or the Employee
may terminate the working relationship at any time without incurring
any liability provided reasonable notice is given.”).
Texas
Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.
1987) (rejecting employee’s claim that he was a permanent employee
rather than an employee at-will, noting that he was entitled to quit at
any time upon giving “reasonably short notice”).
Virginia
Cnty. of Giles v. Wines, 546 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va. 2001) (“In Virginia,
an employment relationship is presumed to be at-will, which means that
the employment term extends for an indefinite period and may be
terminated by the employer or employee for any reason upon reasonable
notice.”).
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ii. Historical Cases
California
Mile v. Cal. Growers Wineries, 114 P.2d 651, 679–80 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1941) (noting in action by at-will wine salesman to recover
commissions that “[personal services] contracts may be terminated by
either party at will, upon giving the adverse party reasonable notice
thereof”).
Missouri
Paisley v. Lucas, 143 S.W.2d 262, 271 (Mo. 1940) (“[A]ppellant’s
contract . . . was a contract for employment as general insurance agent
and manager for an indefinite term and it could, therefore, be cancelled
by either party upon reasonable notice to the other.”).
Clarkson v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 170 S.W.2d 407, 415 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1943) (“[When an employment contract is] executed for an
indefinite period, and by its nature it is not deemed to be perpetual, it
may be terminated at will upon reasonable notice.”).
New York
Ward v. Ruckman, 34 Barb. 419 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1861) (“[An
employment] contract cannot be unlimited in respect to duration; and
when no time is fixed for its continuance, it must be considered as
subject to be terminated by either party on reasonable notice, if the
interest of either requires a change.”).
Texas
Island Lake Oil Co. v. Hewitt, 244 S.W. 193, 194–95 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922) (noting that “’when a contract calls for the rendition of services,
if it is so far incomplete as that the period of its intended duration
cannot be determined by a fair inference from its provisions, either
party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at will on giving reasonable
notice of his intention to do so’” in holding that indefinite employment
contract was terminable upon circumstances implying actual notice).
Virginia
Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 55 S.E. 551,
552 (Va. 1906) (“[W]hen a contract calls for the rendition of services, if
it is so far incomplete as that the period of its intended duration cannot
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be determined by a fair inference from its provisions, either party is
ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at will on giving reasonable notice of
his intention to do so”).
2. “NO NOTICE” CASES
a. Cases Holding or Presuming that At-Will Employment
May be Terminated Without Notice
i. Contemporary Cases
Alabama
Allied Supply Co., Inc. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 34–35 (Ala. 1991)
(holding that managers at an industrial supply company who conspired
to quit simultaneously without warning were not liable for breach of
fiduciary duty because “implicit in the ‘employment-at-will’ doctrine is
the concept that an employee at will can be discharged, or, conversely,
can terminate his employment, without prior notice”).
Louisiana
Harrison v. CD Consulting, Inc., 2006 WL 1194749 (La. Ct. App.
2006) (concluding that an at-will employee was not required to provide
advance notice of departure in rejecting employer’s breach of fiduciary
duty claim).
Finkle v. Majik Mkt., 628 So. 2d 259, 260, 262 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that assistant manager of a retail store who had a “simple, atwill employment” relationship and “no specific contract” could be
terminated without notice).
Michigan
Garavaglia v. Centra, Inc., 1998 WL 1991630, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998) (concluding that “[w]hile defendants were not required to give
advance notice of their intentions to terminate the parties’ agreement,
defendants should have notified plaintiff that the contract was
terminated” in awarding plaintiff retainer fees for period in which he
was unaware of termination).
Missouri
Boyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246, 247–48 (E.D. Mo. 1903)
(rejecting a claim by workers terminated without notice and blacklisted
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for union activity, concluding that “in a free country like ours every
employ[ee] . . . has the legal right to quit the service of his employer
without notice, and either with or without cause, . . . [and] any employer
may legally discharge his employ[ee], with or without notice, at any
time”).
Virginia
Calquin v. Doodycalls Fairfax, 2009 WL 2947367, at *3 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 11, 2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim against waste removal
company for immediate termination as “there is no advance notice
requirement for a termination of an at-will employee”).
Perry v. American Home Products, 1997 WL 109658, at *8–9 (E.D. Va.
1997) (rejecting chemist’s claim for pharmaceutical company’s failure
to provide notice of termination concluding that requiring reasonable
notice would “eviscerate the at-will doctrine”).
ii. Historical Cases
Hawaii
Crawford v. Stewart, 25 Haw. 300, 301 (1920) (rejecting employee’s
claim for failure to provide notice of termination, concluding that “the
requirement of such notice would abrogate entirely [the principle] that a
hiring for a stipulated sum per month without anything further being
agreed upon to fix the term of hiring constitutes an indefinite hiring and
is terminable at the will of either party”).
New York
Town & Country House & Home Serv. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724,
728 (N.Y. 1958) (noting in rejecting employer’s claim against former
home cleaning workers that “[i]t would have been courteous of
[employees] to have given [their employer] advance notice that they
were going to leave. . . , but their employment was at will, which legally
required no notice to be given”).
Pennsylvania
Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 434 (1864) (sanctioning immediate
termination of exclusive agency contract between landowner and his
hired sales agent, holding that the employment was not subject to the
one-year presumption, but was terminable at the defendant’s pleasure
and that “no notice was necessary”).
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b. Cases Reciting that At-Will Employment Permits
Termination “Without Notice”
i. Contemporary Cases
Colorado
Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987) (en
banc) (“An employee who is hired in Colorado for an indefinite period
of time is an ‘at will employee,’ whose employment may be terminated
by either party without cause and without notice, and whose termination
does not give rise to a cause of action.”).
Massachusetts
Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., Inc., 525 N.E.2d 411, 412
(Mass. 1988) (“Employment at will is terminable by either the
employee or the employer without notice, for almost any reason or for
no reason at all.”).
Welgoss v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 2012-1549-C, 2013 WL 4007929, at
*4 (Mass. Super. 2013) (“The essence of at-will employment is a
mutual understanding between employer and employee that the
relationship is of indefinite duration, and that either party may terminate
it at any time without notice, cause or financial consequence.”).
New York
Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755 (N.Y. 2003) (“The traditional
American
common-law
rule
undergirding
employment
relationships . . . is the presumption that employment for an indefinite or
unspecified term is at will and may be freely terminated by either party
at any time without cause or notice.”).
Kotick v. Desai, 507 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“At
will employment permits either party to terminate the employment
relation without advance notice . . . .”).
Grozek v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 406 N.Y.S.2d 213, 213 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978) (“It is well-settled that unless there is a definite period of service
specified in a contract, the hiring is at will and the employer has the
right to discharge and the employee to leave at any time, without
advance notice, and neither has any cause of action against the other.”).
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Ohio
Bauserman v. Katy Steel & Aluminum Co., 1986 WL 1689, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1986) (“Appellee, therefore, remained an at-will employee
even after signing the agreement, and his employment could be
terminated without notice and for any reason.”).
Oregon
Handam v. Wilsonville Holiday Partners, LLC., 201 P.3d 920, 923 (Or.
Ct. App. 2009) (“The general rule in Oregon is that employment is ‘at
will.’ That means that, except as otherwise provided by statute or
employment agreement, employees may be terminated without notice
and for any reason.”).
Tennessee
Lee v. City of LaVergne, 2003 WL 1610831, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003) (“The law is well settled in Tennessee that an at-will employee
may be terminated for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all, without
notice.”).
Texas
Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1993) (“[Plaintiff]
was an employee at will and subject to termination without notice or
cause.”).
Alvarado v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2013 WL 4603394, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 28, 2013) (“Most of [defendant’s] employees are employed
on an ’at will’ basis, meaning that either the employee or [the
defendant] can terminate the employment relationship with or without
cause and with or without notice.”).
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ii. Historical Cases
Michigan
O’Connor v. Hayes Body Corp., 242 N.W. 233, 234 (Mich. 1932) (“The
contract of employment, being for no definite period, was a hiring at
will and could have been terminated, at any time, by either party
without notice.”).
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